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David H. Getches*

Managing the Public Lands: The
Authority of the Executive to
Withdraw Lands
INTRODUCTION

Historically the executive branch of the federal government-primarily
the President and the Secretary of the Interior-has protected public lands
by withdrawing them from availability for private acquisition and use
allowed under public land laws. Homesteading, mining and other uses
ordinarily considered proper on the public domain were prevented in
order to preserve resources or to dedicate them to a public purpose.
Beginning soon after the nation's founding, numerous military bases and
Indian reservations were set aside by executive orders withdrawing lands
from the public domain. Other lands were set aside for wide ranging
purposes dictated by the national interest. Although it is not widely appreciated, the use of withdrawals has been a major force in conservation
law and history, especially during those eras when statutory law was not
nearly as broad and diverse as it is today.
Withdrawal remains an important device in federal land use planning
and management. Significant fragile wildlife habitat may need protection
from mining pending consideration of legislation to designate it as a park
or wildlife refuge. Lands rich in petroleum or oil shale may be removed
from operation by statutes that would allow private uses and development
because they can be developed most efficiently under a coordinated national program. Wild areas may be protected from commercial uses so
that they may remain in their pristine state. Today, public land managers
may have several ways to accomplish their desired results. Yet one of
the most effective means is withdrawal.
Although Congress has plenary power over the public lands,' in the
past most withdrawals were made by the executive on the assumption
that no statutory delegation of authority was needed. Congress's failure
to repudiate the executive's withdrawals led the courts to infer acquies*Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author appreciates
the thoughtful review of an earlier draft of this article by Charles F. Wilkinson and Lee Laitala. The
research assistance of Julia Ormes Robinson was extremely helpful. The Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation kindly provided a grant to aid in the research.
1. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (the Property Clause) states: "The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States." See generally Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976).
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cence. The inference may have been unjustified but became a well entrenched justification. While Congress made some specific delegations of
withdrawal authority over the years, the executive's implied nonstatutory
authority was construed to fill all the interstices around express delegations.
In the 1976 Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA)2 all nonstatutory authority and most earlier statutory authority were extinguished
and replaced with new procedures for making withdrawals. 3 The revolutionary impact of the 1976 Act touches only withdrawals made after
its enactment. 4 Consequently, the effectiveness of earlier non-statutory
withdrawals of millions of acres throughout the country is governed by
legal principles as they existed before the Act. Recent exercises of authority under both the FLPMA and the vestigial statutory withdrawal
authority have drawn fire from private development interests and state
governments. Multimillion acre withdrawals in Alaska have provoked
litigation, 5 and the "lock-up" by federal officials of resource-rich lands
elsewhere has spurred on the "Sagebrush Rebellion"-a
movement seek6
ing greater state control of federal lands.
This article reviews and analyzes judicial interpretations of executive
withdrawal authority in the past and makes suggestions for the construction and application of statutorily based withdrawal authority. The legal
basis for executive withdrawal authority was tenuous, at least at the time
the early withdrawals were made. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
upheld non-statutory executive authority in one major case. Based on the
reasoning in that case most withdrawals should withstand judicial challenge because of the passage of time and the Court's pragmatic desire
not to disturb an established allocation of power that has been accommodated by both the executive branch and Congress. There is likely to
be considerable deference to the executive's own interpretations of its
authority and to its decisions to exercise the statutory authority that now
must be invoked to support new withdrawals. Reviewing courts might
have curtailed executive withdrawals in an earlier era had they acted
consistently with apparent federal policy and congressional intent. But
today the same considerations in a milieu of resource conservation demand
2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
3. Id. § 1714. See text section IV B, infra.
4. Id. § 1701 and § 1714(j). Although withdrawal provisions of the FLPMA are prospective,
the Act requires a study to be made of all existing withdrawals followed by a report to Congress.
See also notes 211-12, infra.
5. See notes 118-23, 245-54 infra
and accompanying text.
6. The Sagebrush Rebellion and related legal arguments are discussed in Touton, The Property
Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817 (1980); Note, The
Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505; Leshy,
Unravelling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U. CAL. DAVIS L.
REV. 317 (1980).
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great latitude for officials who act to protect lands by withdrawals. Challenges to decisions to withdraw areas are likely to fail, except to the
extent they demonstrate a departure from explicit statutory procedures.
I. PUBLIC LAND WITHDRAWALS BEFORE THE 1910
PICKETT ACT
A. Public Land Policy: A Shift from Disposal to Conservation
From the close of the Revolutionary War until the mid-nineteenth
century the United States amassed more than two billion acres under its
sovereignty, and ownershipT-a land area more than seven times the size
of the original thirteen states. 8 The principal asset of the fledgling nation
was the real property it obtained in bargains with foreign nations, 9 the
original states' ° and Indian tribes." No sooner was the vast public domain
7. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 327
(1970) [hereinafter PLLRC REPORT]. Acquisition of sovereignty and ownership was generally
perfected in separate transactions, first a cession from a foreign nation or a state, followed by a
treaty or agreement with an Indian tribe. In Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)
a settler who had received a patent from the United States prevailed over a settler who traced his
title to a grant from the Indians. The result was based on tacit understandings among European
discoverers of the New World that title would vest in the discovering nation, subject to limited
Indian occupancy rights. Assertion of sovereignty by the Europeans deprived Indians of the ability
to dispose of their lands to anyone but the sovereign. See note II infra.
8. The territory of the 13 original states (including what is now the District of Columbia, then
within Maryland and Virginia; Kentucky and West Virginia, then within Virginia; Maine, then within
Massachusetts; and Vermont, then within New York) after they ceded their western land to the United
States (see note 10 infra) amounted to some 266 million acres. Figures taken from PLLRC REPORT,
supra note 7, Appendix F at 327.
9. Major examples are: Louisianna Territory, 523 million acres west of the Mississippi River,
purchased from France in 1803 for three cents an acre (8 Stat. 200, 206, 208, T.S. No. 86, 86-A,
86-B); Florida, acquired by treaty with Spain in 1819 (8 Stat. 252, T.S. No. 327); the border with
Canada from Minnesota west, fixed at the 49th parallel by treaties with Great Britain in 1818, adding
the Red River Basin (8 Stat. 248, T.S. No. 112) and in 1846 adding the Oregon Territory-180
million acres (9 Stat. 869, T.S. No. 120); California and the Southwest, acquired by the Treaty of
Guadaloupe Hidalgo with Mexico in 1848 (9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207) and the Gadsden Purchase
in 1853 (10 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 208); and Alaska, purchased from Russia in 1867 for $7.2 million
(15 Stat. 539, T.S. No. 301).
10. Seven of the original states ceded lands, generally those lying west of their present boundaries, after the Constitution was ratified: New York, 1780; Virginia, 1783; Massachusetts, 1785;
Connecticut, 1786; South Carolina, 1787; North Carolina, 1790; Georgia, 1802. See P. GATES,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 51-55 (1968) [hereinafter GATES]. Texas
sold 78.8 million acres to the United States in 1850. Id. at 82.
I1. The European nations asserted rights to the territory they claimed in America exclusive of
other European countries, but recognized Indian rights of occupancy. Thus, they acquired a right to
govem the area, but not title to real estate. This interest passed intact to the United States on its
acquisition of the area by treaty or purchase. The new nation generally chose to extinguish Indian
land claims by treaty and purchase from Indian tribes rather than by bitter and difficult conquest.
See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 503 (1823); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 483 F.Supp. 597 (D.
Conn. 1980); Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28 (1947). See generally, F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, Chs. 2A and 3A (2d ed. 1982); D. GETCHES, D.
ROSENFELT, AND C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 143152 (1979).
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acquired by the United States than the government began a purposeful
effort to dispose of it.' 2 This was to produce income from land sales.
More significantly, in private hands the land became a vehicle for development at the frontier and beyond.
"Public land law"' 3 historically referred to legislation providing for
disposal of the public domain.' 4 Homestead laws and government sales
dispensed cheap land; 5 mining laws opened the west's mineral wealth,
free to the first to claim it;' 6 gifts of free land to railroads secured the
rapid development of commerce linking the industrial east with the agricultural and resource rich west; 7 and land grants to new states aided
education and local economics.' 8
12. Perhaps the primary motivation for disposal was the desperate need for revenues to discharge
the public debt, much of which consisted of foreign obligations. Encouraging migration and promoting population were other goals. The Land Ordinance of 1785 was the first legislative attempt
to provide for orderly disposal of the public lands, by sale after completion of surveys. See generally,
GATES, supra note 10.
13. The term "public land law" is generally understood to mean statutes and regulations goveming the retention, management, and disposition of the public lands. See Act of Sept. 19, 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 3, 78 Stat. 982, 983, creating a Public Land Law Review Commission to
study such laws. But see Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) (The Court stated that the term
"public-land laws" does not include the mining or mineral leasing laws. The particular withdrawal
orders had been construed as not preventing oil and gas leases. The court did not consider the use
of the term generally or even under the statute authorizing the orders. Thus, the dictum is an aberration
from the usual construction of the term. See also Mecham v. Udall, 369 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1966)
(rejecting contention that executive order did not validly withdraw lands from mineral leasing). Cf.
Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923) (executive order withdrawing lands "from settlement
and entry, or other form of appropriation" removed the lands from the mining and mineral leasing
laws). The term "withdrawal" as used in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
99 1701-1782 (1976), has been held to include removal from oil and gas leasing. Pacific Legal
Foundation v. Watt, No. CV-81-141-BLE (D.Mont., Memorandum Decision, Dec. 16, 1981); Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F.Supp. 383 (D.Wyo. 1980).
14. The focus on public land law as a body of private law involving rights of private individuals
to federal land, minerals and other resources is demonstrated by the early treatises. E.g., M. COPP,
PUBLIC LAND LAWS (1875); G. SPAULDING, A TREATISE ON THE PUBLIC LAND SYSTEM
OFTHE UNITED STATES (1884); J. ZABRISKIE, THE PUBLIC LAND LAWS OFTHE UNITED
STATES (1870). Although Congress's power under the Property Clause is framed in terms of disposal,
see note I, supra, the property power has been much more broadly construed in recent years. See,
e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
15. See Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 464 (1796); Act of April 24, 1820, ch. 51, 3 Stat.
566 (1820); Act of August 4, 1854, ch. 244, 10 Stat. 574 (1854); Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75,
12 Stat. 392 (1862), (repealed 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744); Desert Land Act of
1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877); Kinkaid Act of 1904, ch. 1801, 33 Stat. 547 (1904); Enlarged
Homestead Act of 1909, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (1909); Stockraising Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9,
39 Stat. 862 (1916).
16. Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262. 14 Stat. 251 (1866); Placer Act of 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat.
217 (1870); Mining Law of 1872 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-24, 26-28, 29, 30, 3343, 46-48, 50-52, 71-76 (1976)).
17. See GATES, supra note 10, at 357. E.g., Act of September 20, 1850, ch. 61, 9 Stat. 466
(1850). See also Act of Aug. 4, 1852, ch. 80, §2, 10 Stat. 28 (1852). Some ninety million acres
were given to the railroads, most of which were sold by them to private parties to raise capital. See
G. COGGINS AND C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 8889 (1981) [hereinafter COGGINS AND WILKINSON].
18. E.g., Act of April 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173-175 (1802); Agricultural College Act, ch.
130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862). See generally, GATES, supra note 10, chs. 12, 13.
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A few early withdrawals of lands from availability under the disposal
laws were made to preserve some sites for military or Indian reservations
and for other public uses. 9 The device of "withdrawing" specific parcels
of land from entry eventually was to become an important means of
accomplishing federal purposes or policies when disposal laws threatened
to sweep with too broad a brush.
As the west was settled and frontiers vanished, much land remained
in federal ownership. By the end of the nineteenth century 67 per cent
of the original public domain outside Alaska had been transferred to
private ownership, but 473,836,402 acres were still owned by the United
States.2" Much of it was poor land that could not be used economically
for the purposes for which it was available. 2 Other land had been exploited for its resources and once used was left behind.2" Yet some good
land survived. In a few instances land had been overlooked because of
its inaccessibility or because the value of its resources was not apparent.
Withdrawals and other legal impediments to availability for distribution
also had saved valuable land.
Fulfillment of many of the national goals that had inspired the disposal
policy and a changing vision of the future role of public lands prompted
a policy shift. The conservation movement was born in a wake of reaction
against the excesses-lawful and unlawful--of land barons and lesser
exploiters of the public lands. 3 "Conservation" has always had diverse
adherents, some favoring policies that enable perpetual use of resources,
others insisting on preservation of lands in a pristine state. In the late
nineteenth century disciples of both philosophies agreed that action was
needed to protect the public domain from total dissipation. Lands that
once were considered only to be temporarily warehoused for later dis19. For example, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 347 (1817) authorized withdrawals of timber land to supply
the Navy; the Oregon Enabling Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496, 500 (1850), preserved authority for the
President to make necessary withdrawals for military installations and other needful public uses; ch.
148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) authorized the President to make reservations of western land for Indians.
See also note 67, infra. Other early statutes authorized withdrawals of town sites, salt springs,
mineral deposits, or lighthouses in specified places. See WHEATLEY, STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS
AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS 55 (rev. 1969) [hereinafter WHEATLEY
REPORT]. The report, prepared for the Public Land Law Review'Commission is the most comprehensive source on withdrawals.
20. The amount of land remaining the the public domain was reported as of June 30, 1904 by
the Public Lands Commission in S.Doc.No. 189, 58th Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1905).
21. For example, homesteads were limited in size to an area that was too small for profitable
cultivation or grazing in the arid West. COGGINS AND WILKINSON, supra note 17 at 71.
22. For example, huge amounts of timber were harvested from the public lands, particularly in
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan, by loggers who cut the trees and then moved on, successfully
resisting regulation. See Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENVT'L L.
239 (1978) [hereinafter Huffman].
23. See S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY 69-119 (1980). See
generally, M. NICHOLSON, THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION: A GUIDE FOR THE NEW
MASTERS OF THE WORLD 1970; S. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1963); L. PEFFER, THE
CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1951).
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tribution to the private sector were now perceived as national resources
to be protected. A trend developed toward more scientific management
of forests with the goal of protecting timber supply and watersheds that
were important both for flood prevention and for preserving a supply of
water. Management, rather than disposal of resources, became the mission
of agencies administering federal lands.
In 1891 Congress passed the General Revision Act. 24 The contents of
the Act reflect the mix of views about the appropriate use of the public
lands which was prevalent on the cusp between the eras of disposal and
retention of public lands. On one hand, the 1891 act dealt gently with
persons whose depredations upon the public timber lands could have been
prosecuted but, on the other hand, it gave the executive authority to
reserve forest lands that it had sought for several years. 25 Six years later,
Congress passed the Forest Service Organic
Act authorizing the estab26
lishment of an agency to manage forests.
As concern for conservation grew within the government and among
the general public there were occasional flurries of congressional interest
in protecting areas that were distinguished for their aesthetic or recreational value. In 1872 a two million acre parcel, which later became known
as Yellowstone National Park, was established by Congress "as a public
park or pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people. .. 27 Before the end of the century several other national parks
were established. 28
The most remarkable development under the nation's new land policy
was passage of the Taylor Grazing Act which, as amended, allowed the
Secretary of Interior to classify and limit entry upon public lands. 29 This
is generally considered the cardinal event in closing the public domain.
A series of other congressional acts in the early 20th century further
24. Ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891).
25. Id. § 24. This section is often referred to as the Forest Reserve Act.
26. Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 34 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§473-81 (1976)).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1976). Parcels which had earlier been withheld from disposal to private
hands later became portions of national parks. Lands in what would become Hot Springs National
Park in Arkansas were set aside for "future disposal" in 1832. Ch. 70, 4 Stat. 505 (1832). Parcels
in California were granted to the State of California in 1864 to be held in trust by that state for
public use, resort, and recreation. Ch. 184, 13 Stat. 325 (1864). In 1905 the California land was
ceded back to the United States and became part of Yosemite National Park. J. Res. 27, 34 Stat.
831 (1906).
28. Mackinac Island, Michigan was set aside as a national park in 1875. Ch. 191, 18 Stat. 517
(1875). It was disestablished in 1895. Ch. 189, 28 Stat. 946 (1895). In 1890 the mountain area
surrounding Yosemite Valley in California was "set aside as reserved forest lands," ch. 926, 26
Stat. 478 (1890), and lands which became part of Sequoia National Park in California were set aside
as a park. Ch. 1263, 26 Stat. 650 (1890). Some of these lands are now part of Kings Canyon
National Park. Mount Rainier in Washington became a park in 1899. 16 U.S.C. § 91 (1976).
29. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 865, §7, 48 Stat. 1269, amended, Act of June 26, 1936, ch.
842, title 1, §2, 49 Stat. 1976 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315f).
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evinced a developing policy of conservation. At times, the executive
moved more swiftly and extensively than pleased many members of
Congress. But generally the conservation policy which conceded broad
managerial authority to the executive enjoyed majority support. Of these
developments, the leading historian of public land law has written:
For a country whose policy from the outset had been to pass the
public lands into private ownership as speedily as possible, this series
of acts to preserve areas of considerable size in public ownership
was a remarkable change in attitude. Together with the adoption of
the Forest Reservation Act, they mark a turning point in public land
policy.3"
B. Withdrawal as a Conservation Tool
Congress and the executive responded to growing concerns for the
protection of the remaining public domain by making massive "withdrawals" of public lands-preventing certain uses on them, and by establishing "reservations"--dedicating lands to particular uses.3 The scope
and purposes of withdrawals have differed, as have the methods and
authority by which they were created.32 Withdrawals and reservations
usually are made by a congressional or an executive act that designates
specific land and the uses from which it is withdrawn or the purposes for
which it is reserved. Withdrawals may be made with or without a reservation.33 Virtually all of the present public land-about one-third the land
area in the United States-has been withdrawn from some uses.34 As such
30. GATES, supra note 10, at 567.
31. Congress withdrew Yellowstone National Park in 1872. ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 1872); President
Roosevelt withdrew 150 million acres as forest reserves under the General Revision Act of 1891
and 66 million acres of coal lands; President Taft withdrew three million acres of petroleum lands
in 1909. See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text.
32. Withdrawal of public lands occurs in one of four ways. Congress may make withdrawals
by statute (e.g., create a national park). Or it may authorize withdrawals by the executive branch,
either at the executive's discretion, but for a specific purpose designated by Congress (e.g., the
Antiquities Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1976)), or for a general public purpose, with both selection
and purpose left to executive discretion (e.g., the Pickett Act, ch. 421 §§ 1-3, 36 Stat. 847 (1910)
(§§ I & 3 repealed 1976; § 2 codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 142 (1976)). Finally, the executive
in the past has made withdrawals pursuant to authority delegated by congressional acquiescence.
E.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co, 236 U.S. 459 (1915). See WHEATLEY REPORT, supra
note 19, at A4.
33. In a few situations Congress has withdrawn certain resources without specifying the particular
lands on which they are located. E.g., Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976 & Supp.
11 1978) (withdrawing all oil, gas, coal and other fuel minerals from operation of the mining laws);
43 U.S.C. § 300 (repealed by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2744,
2792) (withdrawing lands which contain a spring or waterhole); Exec. Order No. 5327, April 15,
1930 (withdrawing oil shale deposits and lands containing them from disposal under Mineral Leasing
Act); Exec. Order No. 5389, July 30, 1930 (withdrawing lands containing hot springs).
34. WHEATLEY REPORT, supra note 19, at 1. Shortly after the enactment of the Taylor
Grazing Act (43 U.S.C. §§ 315 et seq.; see note 29 and accompanying text), the President withdrew
all unreserved public lands in all states from entry for purposes other than mining and mineral
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there is no more "pure" public domain, open to unrestricted private
appropriation under the panoply of public land laws, yet most public land
remains open to the public for more limited purposes, subject to authorization by the executive.
Congress has authorized a number of executive withdrawals. The first
major example was the Forest Reserve provision in the General Revision
Act.35 It led to massive withdrawals of land as soon as it became law,
and by 1909 the Act had been used to set aside more than 194 million
acres. 36 The efforts of some congressmen to repeal the President's authority to withdraw forest lands were fruitless.3 7 However, they were
successful in revoking presidential authority to proclaim reserves in six
states.38 President Theodore Roosevelt signed the law, but not before
proclaiming 32 new reserves and extending existing forest reserves in the
39
six states where new reserves would be prohibited.
In 1906 Congress enacted the Antiquities Act which permitted the
President to proclaim national monuments where landmarks, structures,
and "other objects of historic or scientific interest" are located. 4" Subsequently, the executive has been authorized by Congress to withdraw
lands for other special purposes such as inclusion in proposed water power
projects, 4 fish and game sanctuaries in national forests, 42 inclusion in
grazing districts pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act, 4 3 and national defense
needs .4"
There is no question that Congress has constitutional authority to make
or to authorize withdrawals by legislative act. 45 But arguments that the
executive has some inherent constitutional authority to make withdrawals
of public lands are without merit. 46 Yet it is well-known that federal
leasing. Exec. Order No. 6910, November 26, 1934; Exec. Order No. 6964, February 5, 1935.
Lands may be separately withdrawn for more than one purpose. A prior withdrawal is not affected
by a subsequent one for a different purpose. Haley v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1960); William
H. Ward, 51 INTERIOR DEC. 158 (1925); Utah v. Lichliter, 50 INTERIOR DEC. 231 (1924).
35. Ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891). See text accompanying notes 24-25, supra.
36. GATES, supra note 10, at 580. See also Huffman, supra note 22.
37. Huffman, supra note 22, at 259.
38. Ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1271 (1907).
39. GATES, supra note 10, at 582; Huffman, supra note 22, at 269.
40. 16 U.S.C. §§431-433 (1976).
41. 16 U.S.C. §818 (1976) (Federal Power Act).
42. 16 U.S.C. §694 (1976).
43. 43 U.S.C. §315 (1976).
44. 43 U.S.C. §§ 155-58 (1976).
45. A coalition of western states led by Nevada and Utah have raised constitutional questions
about federal authority to retain ownership and management of large amounts of land within their
borders. Their objections are based largely on the 10th Amendment guarantee of state sovereignty
and the alleged violation of the equal footing doctrine. See [1979] 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 530.
See also note 6, supra.
46. The courts have recognized some inherent presidential authority in foreign affairs. This
authority is not extensive enough to permit the President to exercise general powers delegated to
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officials charged with managing public lands regularly make decisions to
allow or deny private uses. To allow uses without some delegation of
authority from Congress arguably usurps the authority of the legislative
branch under the Property Clause. To deny private uses, on the other
hand, preserves congressional prerogatives and flexibility. Conflicts have
arisen, however, when private interests have sought to use public lands
under some legislatively created program but were denied that use because
an administrative official had withdrawn land from availability. Under
these circumstances the action may be challenged as in excess of the
official's authority. In absence of a statute permitting a withdrawal or
some other protective classification of the land, it is argued that a restriction of congressionally authorized uses is invalid. In some instances
courts have implied a delegation of authority from the failure of Congress
to curtail executive actions; in others authority has been derived from the
executive's interpretation of a general withdrawal statute.
Congress by the Constitution, such as disposing of public property. The power is not exclusive in
Congress, however, as the President may dispose of property through his constitutional power to
make treaties. Edwards v. Carter, 445 F.Supp. 1279 (D.D.C. 1978).
While the executive enjoys only limited inherent power over foreign relations, it has still less
inherent power in domestic affairs. The modem cases in this area leave virtually no room for a
finding of inherent authority. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1977)
(rejecting inherent executive authority to engage in warrantless electronic surveillance in domestic
security cases). Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (rejecting
executive authority to seize steel mills to avert strikes during wartime as usurpation of Congress's
asserted legislative authority in labor matters). See generally. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 181-84 (1978).
Given the sweeping grant to Congress of authority over public property, U.S. CONST., art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2; Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), inherent executive authority to withdraw
public lands cannot be sustained. The issue is discussed in the WHEATLEY REPORT, supra note
19, at 131-51. The executive nevertheless has occasionally maintained that it has some "inherent"
authority under the Constitution (article 2, sec. 1) to make withdrawals. This has been done in
recitations found in orders withdrawing lands. e.g., Exec. Order No. 7373, May 20, 1936; in
administrative decisions, e.g., Denver R. Williams, 67 INTERIOR DEC. 315 (1960); P & G Mining
Co., 67 INTERIOR DEC. 212 (1960); Noel Leuscher, 62 INTERIOR DEC. 210 (1955); in litigation,
e.g., Brief for Appellant, United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915); Defendant's
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2-3, Portland General
Electric Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F.Supp. 859 (D. Wyo. 1977); and in congressional hearings, e.g.,
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Public Lands and Surveys on the Administration
and Use of Public Lands, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., part 14, 4360, 4366, 4368 (1945).
In Midwest Oil the Supreme Court did not reach the government's contention that the President
had inherent withdrawal authority, but rested its decision upholding a withdrawal solely on a delegated
power implied from the acquiescence of Congress. 236 U.S. at 468-69. Nevertheless the decision
has been cited for the proposition that "the power of withdrawal is inherent in the President. .... "
Shaw v. Work, 9 F.2d 1014, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1925). See also P & G Mining Co., 67 INTERIOR
DEC. 212 (1960). Administrative decisions relying on Midwest Oil were cited as grounds for inherent
withdrawal authority in Portland General Electric Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F.Supp. 859 (D. Wyo. 1977).
This reliance is misplaced. These and other references to "inherent authority" confuse it with
impliedly delegated authority. No judicial decision was found: (1) where there was neither an
authorizing statute nor a contention of impliedly delegated authority, and (2) in which the court or
administrative agency relied entirely upon inherent executive authority.
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Challenges to executive withdrawal authority have been frequent in
the history of the public domain. The challengers include those who would
develop or use the land for purposes fostered by the public land laws but
who are precluded by the land's withdrawal. Thus, a mining company
or a state interested in economic development may oppose restricting
productive use of land by a withdrawal. The few judicial decisions on
the executive's withdrawal authority fail to prescribe any limits on its
exercise. The courts have been unmoved by private attacks on executive
assertions of the public interest. The usual deference to the government
in disputes asserting private interests in public lands47 has combined with
growing notions of federal stewardship of the public domain to persuade
courts not to confine executive authority to make withdrawals.
Critics of withdrawal practices cite the importance to the country's
well-being of having ready access to the resources contained in the public
domain, especially minerals. They argue that "locking up" about twothirds the public lands from entry under the mining laws seriously hampers
the country's ability to cope with pressures for economic development
and the demand for energy.48 Dependence on foreign nations for energy
resources and minerals
is exacerbated by limiting access to publicly owned
49
domestic resources.
Congress has responded to concerns about the extent of withdrawals
in the past. In a few instances, such as when President Theodore Roosevelt
withdrew 150 million acres for forest reserves under delegated authority
to reserve timber lands, Congress has returned withdrawn land to the
public domain.50 On other occasions Congress has acted to exert control
over the withdrawal process by defining methods by which certain kinds
of withdrawals could be made by the executive and the purposes for
which they could be withdrawn. 5 '
47. See note 274 infra.
48. E.g., Bennethum &.Lee, Is OurAccount Overdrawn?, MINING CONGRESS J. 33 (Sept.
1975). The authors cite a U.S. Geological Survey report forecasting "that within the next 25 years
the United States shall be 100 percent dependent on imports for 12 essential mineral commodities,
more than 75 percent for 15 and more than 50 percent for 26 commodities." Id. at 36, 48. That
two-thirds of the total land area is closed is doubtful. No accurate figures are available; there are
multiple, overlapping withdrawals that distort most calculations. Furthermore, many withdrawn
public lands would not be useful for mining in any event.
49. See Peck, "And Then There Were None" Evolving Federal Restraints on the Availabilit' of
Public Lands for Mineral Development, 25 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 3-1, 3-12, 3-13 (1979).
50. Ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1269 (1970). The 150 million acres were withdrawn by more than 250
presidential proclamations between 1902 and 1909. See, e.g., Presidential Proclamations, 32 Stat.
1988-2036, 33 Stat. 2307-88, 34 Stat. 2991-3310, 35 Stat. 2120-250.
51. E.g., General Revision Act, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891) (authorized executive reservation
of lands wholly or in part covered by timber); Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §431 (1976) (authorized
withdrawal of lands of historic and scientific value; limited size to the smallest area compatible with
management for these values); General Withdrawal Act [Pickett Act], ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (1910),
§§ I & 3 repealed (1976) (granted temporary withdrawal authority to executive but allowed contin-
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The executive's use of withdrawals not authorized by statute and its
expansive reading of statutes delegating withdrawal authority have often
been questioned in litigation. Presidential action setting aside the Tetons
and Grand Canyon were attacked in the past.52 More recently, withdrawals
in Alaska of 56 million acres under the Antiquities Act of 1906 and 105
million acres under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
197651 were challenged as inconsistent with the letter and the purpose of
the acts.5 4
The courts generally sustain an implied delegation of authority to withdraw lands based on congressional deference to longstanding administrative practice, thus effectively rewarding the executive's otherwise
unjustified perseverance in the practice. Similarly, the executive branch
is given wide discretion to interpret its own statutory authority for withdrawals. The common thread is an apparent recognition that the obligation
to protect public resources demands that the land management agencies
be relatively unfettered in carrying out their duty. It is not practical for
Congress, charged by the Constitution with ultimate responsibility for
management and disposal of extensive public lands, 55 to do any more
than to set broad policies. Consequently, Congress must entrust the executive with responsibility for implementing those policies. In turn, reviewing courts regularly defer to an administrative official's plausible
interpretation of how legislation should be implemented, including the
official's view of the scope of his delegated authority. 6 If an official acts
outside the authority granted, of course, the action may be set aside.57
Modern policy, expressed in a host of federal laws, favors protection
and preservation of publicly owned natural resources. Although some
vestiges of the disposal policy of an earlier era remain law, today's goals
uation of hard-rock mineral entry on withdrawn lands); Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1976)
(authorized withdrawal of all public lands in 12 states pending classification and creation of districts
of land chiefly valuable for grazing, which could be used by ranchers who paid a fee and obtained
a license); Defense Withdrawal Act, 43 U.S.C. § 155 (1976) (required express act of Congress for
defense withdrawals in excess of 5,000 acres); Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1976) (repealed all implied withdrawal authority and numerous existing withdrawal statutes
and set up statutory withdrawal scheme; see text at notes 207-235 infra).
52. See notes 128-132, 136-141 infra and accompanying text.
53. See 8 E.L.R. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 10245 (Dec. 1978).
54. Alaska v. Carter, 462 F.Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978). See notes 118-123 infra and accompanying text.
55. See note I supra.
56. E.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965), citing United States v. Midwest Oil,
236 U.S. 459, 472-473 (1915) for the proposition "that unauthorized acts [of the executive] would
not have been allowed [by Congress] to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice."
Midwest Oil is discussed in part IC of the text. See also Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410 (1945).
57. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(B),(C). E.g., Wilderness Society v.
Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
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outweigh the interests expressed in early statutes which were designed
to expedite private exploitation and ownership of the public lands. Thus,
the once noble schemes for bestowing gifts of public assets on those
willing to develop them have become aberrations today when a conflict
arises over how to manage a resource. Policies promoting transfers of
public lands are subordinated to overriding policies of conservation and
intensive management. There have been recent suggestions that Congress's policy should be revised, even to the extent of selling off public
lands to pay the national debt, but there have been no indications that
Congress is inclined to accept these novel ideas.
C. The Midwest Oil Case.
Until 1910 Congress did not deal comprehensively with the authority
of the President to make withdrawals. In that year the General Withdrawal
Act of 1910 (Pickett Act) 8 was passed in response to President Taft's
request for clarification of his authority to make withdrawals. 59 He had
withdrawn 3,621,062 acres of oil and gas lands in 1909' to prevent an
imminent loss of the government's oil and gas resources. Officials had
warned that continuing to allow the mining laws to operate unchecked
would lead to a complete transfer of all oil lands in California from
government control within "a few months."'" Oil and gas were then
becoming essential as fuel for the Navy. Furthermore, intense competition
for oil claims, then under the mining laws, was causing unwise and
wasteful exploration and development practices, and was sacrificing other
possible uses of the public lands.
The withdrawal made by Taft averted the threatened dissipation of
public resources but brought a challenge from private interests whose
claims to oil lands were affected. Saving language in the Pickett Act
58. Ch. 421, §§ 1-3, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (§§ 1 & 3 repealed 1976) (§2 codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. § 142 (1976)).
59. The present statutes, except so far as they dispose of the precious metals and the
purely agricultural lands, are not adapted to carry out the modem view of the best
disposition of public lands to private ownership, under conditions offering on the
one hand sufficient inducement to private capital to take them over for proper
development, with restrictive conditions on the other which shall secure to the public
that character of control which will prevent a monopoly or misuse of the lands or
their products. The power of the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw from the
operation of existing statutes tracts of land, the disposition of which under such
statutes would be detrimental to the public interest, is not clear or satisfactory.
SPECIAL MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT TAFT TO CONGRESS, CONSERVATION OF NATIONAL
RESOURCES, H.R. DOC. NO. 533, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1910). The legislative history of the
Pickett Act is fully discussed and analyzed in WHEATLEY REPORT, supra note 19, at 88-101.
60. Temporary Petroleum Withdrawal No. 5, by order of the Secretary of the Interior, dated
September 27, 1909. See Record on Appeal, United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
61. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 456, 466 (1915).
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stated that it should not be "construed as a recognition, abridgment, or
enlargement of any asserted rights or claims initiated upon any oil- or
gas-bearing lands after any withdrawal of such lands made prior to June
25, 1910. "162 Thus, Congress left the courts with the task of deciding
whether the 1909 withdrawals challenged in Midwest Oil were lawful.
In United States v. Midwest Oil Co.63 the Supreme Court upheld President Taft's withdrawal. It found that the executive possessed impliedly
delegated authority to make withdrawals of public lands. The withdrawal in question had the effect of preventing entry pursuant to the
Mining Act-legislation that was intended to distribute the bounties of
the public lands for the national benefit by allowing mineral development.
The Court declined to accept the government's broad assertion that the
Constitution grants the President authority to withdraw public land.64 But
it sustained the President's withdrawal of land from mineral entry even
though it was not based on any statute. The Court emphasized that Congress had apparently recognized the President's power and had acquiesced
in its exercise. The Supreme Court relied on a "long continued practice"
of making orders like the one in the case which withdrew all the public
lands in an area over 3 million acres from the operation of the public
land laws.65 In support, the Court noted that there were "scores and
hundreds" of orders establishing or enlarging Indian reservations, military
reservations and oil reserves that had not been based on any statutory
authority.66

It was true that many withdrawals had been made by the executive
without direct statutory authorization, but in most cases they were compatible with an existing policy reflected in statute. The dissent in Midwest
Oil argued that for each of the examples of apparent exercises of implied
authority cited by the majority there existed a statute which directly or
indirectly furnished authority for the withdrawal. 67 By contrast, the 1909
62. 43 U.S.C. § 142 (1976).
63. 236 U.S. at 459.
64. See note 46 supra.
65. 236 U.S. 456 (1915).
66. Id. at 469-71.
67. Id. at 492-504. The dissent's point may be overstated, but it is true that most then existing
executive withdrawals could be seen as carrying out some congressionally accepted policy. In many
situations the executive's authority was not expressed by Congress but could be based on vague
directives. In Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 266 (1839), the executive was held entitled to
possession of a military post under a law authorizing the establishment of trading houses with the
Indians and the erection of fortifications by the President. The law [Act of June 19, 1834, ch. 54,
4 Stat. 678] left the choice of location to the President's discretion. Other Indian reservations were
established by executive order pursuant to a national policy of locating Indians on defined lands.
The policy had been generally reflected in treaties and statutes, although particular reservations were
not always for tribes covered by specific legislation. The Supreme Court held that the General
Allotment Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388, confirmed the validity of executive
orders setting aside Indian reservations. In re Wilson, 140 U.S. 575 (1891).
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withdrawal at issue in Midwest Oil was stated to be "in aid of proposed
legislation affecting the use and disposition of the petroleum deposits,"
but it was many years before Congress considered a proposal to deal
comprehensively with such matters. 68 In the meantime, the will of Congress had been established: statutes declared all mineral lands open and
available to the public. 69 While the wisdom of literally giving away the
nation's mineral wealth might be questioned, it did comport with a forthright congressional pronouncement of policy in the mining laws and it
did accelerate expansion and development as Congress intended. Yet the
Court sustained an overriding power to defeat these statutory objectives
by implying acquiescence of Congress in several earlier withdrawals of
public lands from entry.
II. NON-STATUTORY WITHDRAWALS 1910-1976
Because the withdrawal that was upheld in Midwest Oil occurred before
enactment of the Pickett Act of 1910, the Supreme Court did not have
occasion to decide the question of the Act's impact on the executive's
non-statutory withdrawal authority. The Court acknowledged the existence of an extensive executive withdrawal power before the Pickett Act
that had been delegated by congressional acquiescence, but said in dicta
that after 1910 the Act would "restrict the greater power already possessed." 70 To the extent Congress has entered the arena, one might infer
an intent to limit executive authority. The Act stated that "the President
may, at any time in his discretion, temporarily withdraw from settlement,
location, sale, or entry any of the public lands . . . and reserve the same
for . . . public purposes ...
.' Significantly the Act required with-

drawals under its authority to be "open to exploration, discovery, ocupation, and purchase under the mining laws. ..

"72

That Congress was

taking the subject of withdrawals under its control and limiting executive
authority seems plain on the face
of the statute. And that conclusion is
73
supported by legislative history.
68. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§22, 48, 181-287 (1976).
69. "[Any person authorized to enter lands under the mining laws of the United States may
enter and obtain patent to lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils, and chiefly valuable
therefor, under the provisions of the laws relating to placer mining claims.
Act of February
11,1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526 (1897).
70. 236 U.S. at482-83, citing S.REP.NO. 171, 61stCong., 2d Sess. (1910). The report supports
existence of presidential withdrawal authority but, contrary to the Court's suggestion, purports to
change the existing authority only by requiring a report of all withdrawals to Congress. Other
contemporary sources support the Court's interpretation. See note 73, infra. As late as 1924 the
Interior Department agreed that the Pickett Act was a limitation on the executive's withdrawal
authority. Utah v. Lichliter, 50 INTERIOR DEC. 231, 236 (1924).
71. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976).
72. 43 U.S.C. § 142 (1976).
73. E.g.,
"To sum up, in my judgment this bill restricts and limits the power of the President
as it is to-day rather than enlarges it as interpreted by the courts. ...
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The executive was undaunted by the plain meaning of the statute, the
thrust of the legislative history and a Supreme Court interpretation. Administrative officials have consistently denied that the Pickett Act was
meant to be a full explication of its withdrawal authority. Instead of
construing the Act as prohibiting any executive withdrawals except those
permitted by its terms-temporary withdrawals of lands that remain open
under the mining laws 7 4 -and those permitted under other statutes, the
executive still felt that it possessed all the non-statutory authority it had
before the Pickett Act. Whenever the executive felt that it needed to do
what the Pickett Act would not allow, it would do so unhindered by the
statute, on the assumption that it retained the full panoply of withdrawal
authority recognized in Midwest Oil, virtually unaffected by the legislation. It is upon this "authority" that the United States has relied to
succeed against adverse private claimants.
Between 1910 and 1976 millions of acres were withdrawn from the
operation of public land laws, including the mining laws, without statutory
authority. Remarkably, the government position upon which these withdrawals rest has not yet been fully tested.7 5 For the Court in Midwest Oil
to find that congressional acquiescence was tantamount to a delegation
of authority to the executive was a long step. Yet that feat was easy
compared to the leap that is necessary in order to find that the legislative
definition of authority in the Pickett Act imposed no limitations
on ex76
ecutive authority in spite of its apparently narrowing language.
A 1941 opinion of the Attorney General substantially supports the
executive's surprising position that the Pickett Act was only a Congressional footprint on the beachhead of withdrawal authority, not an artic-

I think it is a good plan, in view of the experiences we have had in recent years,
that we put this power in direct and express statutory form rather than the common
law of the courts, and limit it, as we propose to do in the bill.
45 CONG. REC. 7475 (1910) (remarks of Sen. Nelson, chairman of Senate Committee on Public
Lands). One historian has argued that the legislative history is "inconclusive." L. PEFFER, THE
CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 117 (1951). See notes 81-82 infra and accompanying text.
74. But see Portland General Electric Co. v. Andrus, 441 F. 859 (D. Wyo. 1980) (upholding
temporary withdrawal from mineral entry under "implied authority").
75. See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
76. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in a Supreme Court decision rejecting implied
executive authority to seize steel mills is apt. In it he stated:
It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general language and to
say that Congress would have explicitly written what is inferred, where Congress
has not addressed itself to a specific situation. It is quite impossible, however, when
Congress did specifically address itself to a problem, as Congress did to that of
seizure, to find secreted in the interstices of legislation the very grant of power
which Congress consciously withheld. To find authority so explicitly withheld is
not merely to disregard in a particular instance the clear will of Congress. It is to
disrespect the whole legislative process and the constitutional division of authority
between President and Congress.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952).
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ulation of the limits of executive authority after the Act." The opinion
sustained a withdrawal from the mining laws of lands in Oregon needed
for an agricultural research station.78 The Attorney General found that the
Pickett Act dealt only with the Secretary's temporary withdrawal authority. By considering the withdrawal "permanent," the Attorney General found that the Pickett Act's restriction against closures to metalliferous
mining could be avoided. The opinion pointed out that the Act had germinated in circumstances that showed a concern mainly for temporary
withdrawals for conservation purposes.79 While admitting that earlier
versions of the bill which became the Pickett Act were intended to deal
with the entire area of presidential withdrawals, the Attorney General
concluded that inclusion of the word "temporarily" in the bill that passed
showed an intent not to impact the President's impliedly delegated authority to make permanent withdrawals or reservations.80
The history of Congress's deliberations on the Pickett Act reveals no
unequivocal understanding by the Senate of the impact of its addition of
the word "temporarily."8" At least two perceptions of the effect of the
change were expressed, 8" but there is nothing in the history to indicate
77. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (1941). By the time of the opinion other withdrawal statutes had been
enacted. Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §315 (1976); Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §431-433 (1976);
General Revision Act, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891).
78. The station was established in connection with the Taylor Grazing Act. 43 U.S.C. § 315315g, 315h-315m, 315n, 315o-I (1976). The Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw
lands "chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops" to be included in grazing districts. Id.
§ 315. But withdrawals under the Act were left subject to the mining laws. Id. § 315e. Thus, it was
necessary to find some other source of authority for withdrawing the site from operation of the
mining laws.
79. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. at 76-78.
80. Id. at 78-80.
81. See 45 CONG. REC. 7538-52, 7555, 8169-70, 8671 (1910). The administration's request
was that Congress "authorize the Secretary of the Interior temporarily to withdraw lands pending
submission to Congress of recommendations as to legislation to meet conditions or emergencies as
they arise." Neither S. 5485 as reported out of the Senate Committee on Public Lands nor H.R.
24070 as reported out of the House Committee on Public Lands used the word "temporary." The
Senate, without explanation, changed the language of the House bill somewhat, including the addition
of "temporarily" to it. 45 CONG. REC. 8670 (1910).
82. House members concluded that the bill's meaning would not be changed at all. 45 CONG
REC. 8667 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Mondell); id. at 8671 (remarks of Rep. Smith). Others suggested
that it would refer to withdrawals limited in time. Id. at 7555 (remarks of Sen. Smoot); id. at 8671
(remarks by Sen. Taylor). Cf. id. at 7544 (remarks of Sen. Clark in support of an amendment
imposing a definite time limit). It is likely that those senators who were clinging to the latter
interpretation were feeling disappointment over their unsuccessful attempt to amend the Act to provide
for automatic cessation of a withdrawal upon the expiration of the Congress to which the withdrawal
was reported. See S.DOC. NO. 610, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1910) (the minority report of the
committee). See also 45 CONG.REC. 8170 (1910) where it is reported that on a motion to strike
out "temporarily," the committee chair, Sen. Smoot, argued:
I do not take it as a limitation on the power of the President, but I do take it that
it means that the withdrawals, many of which will be restored to the public domain,
are temporary in their nature. Of necessity it should be so, because if the withdrawals
were not temporary in their nature, there would be a permanent withdrawal, with
no likelihood or thought of the land ever being restored to the public domain.
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that the statute did not deal with all of the President's withdrawal authority
as it appears to do on its face. 83 And "temporary" withdrawals lasting
many years have been upheld with no requirement of a fixed expiration
date.84 Significantly, the Act deals distinctly with two types of authority:
first, authority "temporarily [to] withdraw from settlement, location, sale,
or entry any of the public lands . . ." and second, authority to_"reserve
the same for . . . public purposes to be specified in the orders of withdrawals." 8" It is reasonable to conclude that adding "temporarily" to the
first type of authority was to make it clear that the Act applied to more
than "permanent" withdrawals, i.e., reservations (withdrawals with a
designated public purpose). Presumably the statute might have been read
before the amendment as authorizing the President only to "withdraw
. . . public lands . . . and reserve the same . . . for public purposes . .. 86 As enacted, the statute authorizes temporary withdrawals
alone, or temporary withdrawals plus a reservation. The last sentence's
reference to "such withdrawals or reservations" reinforces a construction
that finds both types of authority to be included in the Act's compass. It
is not surprising that the drafters of the Act would attempt to emphasize
the extent of the Pickett Act in light of the rather narrow scope of the
President's inquiry 87
and the sharp differences over the proper limits of
executive authority.
In his 1941 opinion, the Attorney General strained to find authority
for withdrawals and reservations outside the Pickett Act so that withdrawn
lands might be closed to mining. The colorful story behind the opinion,
83.

The President may, at any time in his discretion, temporarily withdraw from
settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States,
including Alaska, and reserve the same for waterpower sites, irrigation, classification
of lands, or other public purposes to be specified in the orders of withdrawals, and
such withdrawals or reservations shall remain in force until revoked by him or by
an Act of Congress.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, § 1,36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976).
84. E.g., Mecham v. Udall, 369 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1966) (temporary withdrawal of 36 years'
duration); Clinton D. Ray, 59 INTERIOR DEC. 466 (1947) (withdrawal in aid of legislation lasting
13'/2 years). See also, WHEATLEY REPORT, supra note 19, Appendix F at 51-54.
The authorities agree that the distinction between temporary and permanent withdrawals is not
the duration but rather the nature of the withdrawal. Permanent withdrawals are dedicated to a
particular use, while temporary withdrawals generally remove public land from most uses. Lowe,
Withdrawals and Similar Matters Affecting Public Lands, 4 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 55 (1958).
See also United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 456,478(1915); Utah v. Lichliter, 50 INTERIOR
DEC. 231 (1924); WHEATLEY REPORT, supra note 19, at 50-51. The somewhat artificial distinction was removed legislatively with the enactment of an all-inclusive definition for withdrawals
in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. See note 219 infra.
85. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Compare S. REP. NO. 171, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) (Committee on Public Lands
majority report stating that the authority expressly given in the bill already existed in the President)
with S. DOC. NO. 610, 61st Cong. 2d Sess. (1910) (committee minority report urging strict
limitations on. presidential withdrawal authority).
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which only came to light in 1968 as a result of the Public Land Law
Review Commission's hearings,88 helps explain how the Attorney General
reached his conclusion. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson was under
intense pressure from several executive departments, including his own,
to uphold nonstatutory withdrawal authority. After nearly a year of machinations the Attorney General adopted and published an opinion supporting the continued existence of an implied delegation of withdrawal
authority. This necessitated withdrawing an earlier, unpublished opinion
that had reached the opposite conclusion 9-that the Act did "define and
limit the power of the President to make withdrawals..." and that
"withdrawals now made must be made in accordance with its terms,
unless made under some other act or acts of Congress. "9
Denial of impliedly delegated authority in the 1941 Attorney General's
opinion not only would have prohibited a proposed withdrawal for the
Squaw Butte Experimental Station in Oregon, the subject of the opinion,
but also would have cast doubt upon the validity of numerous other
executive withdrawals and reservations. Initially the Attorney General
responded to entreaties that the first opinion be reconsidered by pointing
out that the plain language of the Act contradicted the interpretation being
urged, and he adhered to the views he voiced in the first opinion. 9' Yet
his views changed within two months and the first opinion was revoked. 92
Shortly after the new opinion was signed, Attorney General Jackson was
appointed to the United States Supreme Court. 93
Two grounds that received but passing mention in the final Attorney
General's opinion were strenuously pressed by those seeking reconsideration. The argument that unrestricted executive withdrawal authority is
justified by long-standing administrative construction emerges as the enduring rationale for impliedly delegated withdrawal authority. The other
argument, that the practical effect of leaving all lands withdrawn since
the Act (for example, military reservations) open to mining would be
anomalous, provides some support for the reasonableness of the admin88. Copies of exchanges of inter- and intra-departmental correspondence were made available
to the Public Land Law Review Commission by Assistant Attorney General Clyde 0. Martz to
supplement his testimony before the Commission. Copies of the documents are collected in the
WHEATLEY REPORT, supra note 19, Appendix B.
89. Unpublished opinion of the Attorney General (July 25, 1940) (reprinted in the WHEATLEY
REPORT, supra note 19, Appendix B at 6).
90. Id. at 9.
91. Letter to Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, from Robert H. Jackson, Attorney
General (April 11, 1941) (reprinted in WHEATLEY REPORT, supra note 19, at 35).
92. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (1941).
93. Eight days after the opinion (June 12, 1941), Jackson was nominated as a Supreme Court
Justice by President Roosevelt. He was confirmed by the Senate on July 7, 1941, and took the oath
of office on July 11, 1941. There is no evidence to suggest that Jackson's appointment was in any
way related to the matter of the withdrawal opinions.
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istrative interpretation, not its legality. Deference to administrative construction and conduct was, of course, the basis for the Court's legitimation
of pre-Pickett Act withdrawals in Midwest Oil.
One might have concluded reasonably that the realm of withdrawal
authority had been subjected to plenary congressional control and that
any implied authority had been repealed by the Pickett Act, but courts
subsequently read the Act so narrowly that it was rendered almost meaningless. After Midwest Oil the executive continued to operate on the
apparent assumption that whatever it could not do under the express terms
of the Pickett Act it could still do under its implied delegation of authority.
That assumption may have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Each withdrawal after the Pickett Act that escaped the Congress's veto' became
evidence of a continued congressional acquiescence. Although the 1941
Attorney General's opinion cited few examples of congressional acquiescence in the practices it validated, 94 the failure of Congress to respond
to the opinion by denying the survival of implied authority gave the
opinion legitimacy. The executive's actions based on the assumption that
it had authority expressed in the opinion went unchallenged. The longer
without challenge or congressional limitation, the less likely it became
that a court would find an absence of authority. Indeed, the few instances
of congressional termination of executive withdrawals95 might be cited
as indications that Congress would check any exercise of authority with
which it disagreed.
The tortured interpretation indulged by the 1941 Attorney General's
opinion cleverly preserved all the non-statutory "permanent" withdrawals
made after the Pickett Act. If lands to be withdrawn did not need to be
protected from mining activity or were not otherwise excluded by the
Act's terms 96 the executive proceeded comfortably under the Pickett Act.97
When in doubt, residual implied authority, covering the rest of the field,
94. Attorney General Jackson did quote from a previous opinion by his predecessor, Homer
Cummings, relating to a proposed reservation of public lands for use as a migratory bird refuge:
"Numerous Executive orders entirely similar in principle to the proposed order have been issued
over a period of years and there has been no repudiation or disaffirmance of such orders by Congress."
40 Op, Att'y Gen. 73, 83 (1941), quoting from 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 502, 503 (1934). Jackson also
cited six executive orders not made under Pickett Act authority, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. at 82, three
attorney generals' opinions and two court of appeals cases. Id. at 84. All of the latter five decisions
seem to have been justified as the exercise of some inherent withdrawal authority of the executivea questionable rationale, see note 46 supra-and congressional acquiescence was not expressly relied
upon.
95. See, e.g., discussion of Wyoming v. Franke, text accompanying notes 135-149 infra; 43
U.S.C. § 1616(d)(1) (1976) (repealing Exec. Order No. 4582 which withdrew lands in Alaska under
Pickett Act authority).
96. Certain lands that were subject to valid settlements under homestead and other public land
laws were excepted from operation of the Pickett Act. 43 U.S.C. § 142 (1976).
97. In such cases the burdens on the executive were minor. Ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847 (1910)
(repealed 1976) required only that the public purpose of a reservation under the Act be specified.
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was used. Later, even "temporary" withdrawals from mineral entry were
defended as within the executive's impliedly delegated authority.98
The first court test of non-statutory executive authority to make withdrawals after the Pickett Act finally came in 1977. The court in Portland
General Electric Co. v. Kleppe9 found ample impliedly delegated executive authority based on 67 years of apparent congressional acquiescence in executive withdrawal authority, unbridled by the many congressional
enactments in the area.'" The case was a modern version of Midwest
Oil. The Secretary of the Interior had temporarily withdrawn 3 million
acres of oil shale lands in Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah from appropriation under the mining laws. Portland General Electric Co. then located
1,740 uranium claims on some of the withdrawn public lands. When the
government threatened to bring a trespass action against the company in
1975, discovery work was stopped and the company sued Interior Department officials challenging the withdrawal order. At last, judicial attention could be focused on the argument that the Pickett Act comprehended
the executive's withdrawal authority, except as otherwise dealt with by
statute. But apparently the issue had arisen too late.
Without analysis, the court in PortlandGeneral Electric held that the
withdrawal power recognized in Midwest Oil was not ended by the Pickett
Act. The court went on to rule that even if "the Pickett Act did supersede
the implied authority of the President to make withdrawals, Congress
has, by its acquiescence restored that power."' 0' In support of this proposition the court cited the 1941 Attorney General's opinion that had
interpreted the Act as leaving permanent withdrawal authority unimpaired
but as limiting the pre-existing authority for temporary withdrawals. Yet
the court's decision upheld a temporary withdrawal, tacitly stating that
"the President's power to make temporary withdrawals of lands from
mineral entry was not destroyed by this Act." 0 2
Recent indications that the understanding of Congress comported with
the acquiescence theory were cited in Portland General Electric. One
example was the legislative history of the Defense Withdrawal Act recognizing the existence of an implied delegation of authority. 3 Another
was language in a section of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
referring to the Secretary's "existing" authority. 104
98. See, e.g., Portland General Electric Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F.Supp. 859 (D. Wyo. 1977)
(upholding temporary withdrawal of oil shale lands from mineral entry; citing 40 Op. Atty. Gen.
73 (1941) as authority).
99. Portland General Electric Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F.Supp. 859 (D. Wyo. 1977).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 862.
102. Id. at 861.
103. 43 U.S.C. §§ 155-158 (1976). See notes 106-108, infra and accompanying text.
104. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2)(A) (1976). See note 105 infra and accompanying text.
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In the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Congress directed the
Secretary to withdraw some 84 million acres of public lands in Alaska
for congressional consideration as national parks, forests, wildlife refuges, and wild and scenic river systems."°5 The Act specified that this
should be done by the Secretary of Interior "acting under authority provided for in existing law." The directive to withdraw the lands from "all
forms of appropriation under the public land laws, including the mining
and mineral leasing laws," indicates that Pickett Act authority would be
unavailable. The authority under existing law to which Congress referred
could only have been the executive's implied authority.
A more forthright expression of Congress's understanding that it has
impliedly granted withdrawal power to the executive by acquiescence is
found in the legislative history of the Defense Withdrawal Act., 06 The
Senate report on the bill indicates that its purpose is "the recapture by
the Congress of those powers which the executive branch of the government has acquired over a long period of years with respect to the withdrawal of the public lands from settlement, entry, location, and sale under
the public land laws-an Executive power acquired through acquiescence
or silence on the part of Congress. ",07
The report recognizes that Congress
had "since 1941 remained silent, and has therefore indulged in a practice
'... equivalent to acquiescence and consent that the practice be continued until the power exercised is revoked.' " Thus, the bill was "specifically aimed at breaking that silence-if silence it be-with respect to
the Federal property embraced by its terms."' 08 The report confirms that
the intent of the Act was to restrict the scope of authority under which
the executive had been operating. Without fully admitting "silence," the
report rather candidly admits acquiescence.
A further example of congressional acknowledgement that there has
been an implied delegation is found in the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA).' °9 The Act repealed "the implied authority
105. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2)(A) (1976). In addition, § 1616 (d)(l) withdrew all unreserved public
lands in Alaska for 90 days during which the Secretary of Interior was to review them "and determine
whether any portion of these lands should be withdrawn under authority provided for in existing
law to insure that the public interest in these lands is properly protected." It added that " [a]ny further
withdrawal shall require an affirmative act by the Secretary under his existing authority." Other
references to secretarial withdrawal authority are found in the Act's legislative history. E.g., the
conference committee determined that "all Native interests in subsistence resource lands can and
will be protected by the Secretary through the exercise of his existing withdrawal authority." H.
REP. NO. 92-746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971).
106. S. REP. NO. 857, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); CONF. REP. NO. 1347, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1958), reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2227, 2238.
107. S.REP. NO. 857, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1957), reprinted in [1958] US. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2227, 2235.
108. Id. at 12, reprinted at 2238.
109. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1782 (1976).
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of the President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting from
acquiescence of Congress.""10
The Supreme Court's recognition in Midwest Oil of a "grant" of authority to the executive based on congressional acquiescence in practices
before 1910 would not lead inexorably to the conclusion that there was
a "born again" implied delegation of withdrawal authority that authorized
withdrawals after the Pickett Act. Yet congressional attempts to take
control of withdrawals beginning in 1910 have not deterred the executive
from making non-statutory withdrawals. The acquiescence theory is even
more plausible than it was at the time of Midwest Oil because of the
strong policy of retention and management of public lands expressed in
many congressional acts and by the accompanying general policy trend
favoring conservation of natural resources. The same rationale would
favor protective exercises of statutory withdrawal authority.
III. INTERPRETING STATUTORY WITHDRAWAL
AUTHORITY: THE EXAMPLE OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT.
One of the earliest statutes vesting the executive with discretion to
make withdrawals was the Antiquities Act authorizing the proclamation
of national monuments by the President.'" The Act was originally designed to protect objects of historic or scientific interest such as Indian
ruins, but it has been interpreted expansively by the executive. It is the
most important of the few statutes that survived Congress's wholesale
repeal of statutes dealing with executive withdrawal authority in 1976.112
The Antiquities Act gave the President authority to withdraw lands with
no limits on duration, unhindered by any procedural requirements, "13 with
no provision for congressional review,"' and with no fixed acreage limitation. 5 Attempts to limit executive discretion based on language in the
Act that restricts withdrawals to the "smallest area compatible with the
proper care and management of the object to be protected""' 6 and on
congressional intent to protect specific sites such as Indian ruins, rather
than large land areas," 7 have been unsuccessful.
110. Id., § 704(a), 90 Stat. at 2792, quoted in note 208 infra. See notes 207-215 infra.
111. 16 U.S.C. §§431-433 (1976).
112. See notes 209-210 infra and accompanying text.
113. Authority under the Antiquities Act is given to the President. 16 U.S.C. §431 (1976). The
President has delegated his withdrawal authority to the Secretary of the Interior. Exec. Order No.
10,355, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831 (1952).
114. Compare this broad discretion with the more detailed provisions and procedures for withdrawal in the FLPMA. See notes 226-241 infra and accompanying text.
115. By contrast the Defense Withdrawal Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 155-158 (1976), permits only
withdrawals of up to 5,000 acres for defense purposes without an act of Congress. See note 231,
infra. See also the FLPMA procedures related to sizes of withdrawals, notes 226-230 infra and
accompanying text.
116. 16 U.S.C. §431 (1976). See notes 124-127 infra and accompanying text.
117. Id. See notes 128-134 infra and accompanying text.
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Most recently the scope of the executive's discretion under the Antiquities Act was called into question as a result of President Carter's 1978
withdrawal of lands for seventeen national monuments encompassing
fifty-six million acres in Alaska. ' 8 The action was motivated by the
imminent expiration of extensive withdrawals under the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act. The lands were being considered for inclusion in
units of land to be managed under one of the federal conservation systems." 9 Challenges came from private interests'2 ° whose development of
minerals under Mining Act claims would be thwarted by national monument designation, and from the State of Alaska' 2' whose land selections
would be limited.' 22 As with every judicial challenge to the exercise of
executive discretion under the Act in the past, the court
dealing with the
23
Alaska lawsuits upheld creation of the monuments.
Congress did not have in mind authorizing withdrawals of vast areas
for designation as national monuments when it passed the Antiquities
118. In a series of proclamations dated December 1,1978, President Carter withdrew and reserved
the following amounts of Alaska land as national monuments to protect the biological, geological,
archaeological and historical value of each area:
Admiralty Island National Monument: 1,100,000 acres
Aniakchak National Monument: 350,000 acres
Becharof National Monument: 1,200,000 acres
Bering Land Bridge National Monument: 2,590,000 acres
Cape Krusenstern National Monument: 560,000 acres
Denali National Monument: 3,890,000 acres
Gates of the Arctic National Monument: 8,220,000 acres
Glacier Bay National Monument [Addition]: 550,000 acres
Katmai National Monument [Addition]: 1,370,000 acres
Kenai Fjords National Monument: 570,000 acres
Kobuk Valley National Monument: 1,710,000 acres
Lake Clark National Monument: 2,500,000 acres
Misty Fiords National Monument: 2,285,000 acres
Noatak National Monument: 5,800,000 acres
Wrangell-St. Elias National Monument: 10,950,000 acres
Yukon-Charley National Monument: 1,720,000 acres
Yukon Flats National Monument: 10,600,000 acres
Proc. Nos. 4611-27, 3 C.F.R. §§ 69-102 (1979) See notes 153-157, infra.
119. See notes 245-255 infra and accompanying text.
120. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 E.R.C. 1853 (D. Alas. 1980).
121. Alaska v. Carter, 462 F.Supp. 1155 (D. Alas. 1978). See note 123 infra.
122: See notes 249-250 infra and accompanying text.
123. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 E.R.C. 1853 (D. Alas. 1980). See authorities cited in
notes 129-146 infra. If pending or subsequent challenges to President Carter's Antiquities Act
withdrawals of Alaska lands by persons who attempted to establish rights (e.g., mining claims) on
those lands should succeed, private rights may be sustained even if the land was withdrawn later
under the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. Act of Dec. 2, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-487, §§ 201-708, 94 Stat. 2371, 2377-2422. However, if the same lands were validly withdrawn,
at the time of private entry under other authority as contemplated by § 17(d)(I) of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(1) (1976) (see note 105 supra), it is likely that private
interests would be defeated.
All of President Carter's withdrawals were rescinded and superseded by the 1980 legislation that
placed the affected land in a variety of classifications (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3209). This led
the parties in Alaska v. Carter, 462 F.Supp. 1155 (D. Alas. 1978), involving challenges to the
withdrawals, to dismiss the pending action. Stipulation of Dismissal dated Aug. 14, 1981.
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Act. The purpose was to set aside minimal areas to protect ruins of
archaeological interest in the American Southwest.' 24 The intent of Congress is captured in the statute's reference to "historic landmarks, historic
and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest" and in its limitation of withdrawn lands to the minimum size
required to care for protected objects. '25 During the floor discussion of
the bill which became the Antiquities Act, some members of Congress
were apprehensive about the potential for using the Act to withdraw large
land areas. Assurances were given by the floor manager that nothing of
the kind was intended. 26 It appears that congressional understanding was
that large, permanent areas would become national parks through congressional action rather than monuments withdrawn under the Antiquities
Act. 127
Whatever Congress thought it was doing in the Antiquities Act, the
executive began using, and has since used, the Act's authority to withdraw
large land areas for a variety of purposes, far removed from simply
protecting Indian relics. President Theodore Roosevelt made more than
a dozen withdrawals under the Act in the two years that followed its
enactment. Although most were of small areas where ruins or some natural
formation was located, some were of huge areas withdrawn for more
general preservation purposes. Most notably, Grand Canyon National
124. H. R. REP. NO. 2224, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1905) states:
There are scattered throughout the Southwest quite a large number of very interesting
ruins. Many of these ruins are upon the public lands, and the most of them are upon
lands of but little present value. The bill proposes to create small reservations
reserving only so much land as may be absolutely necessary for the preservation of
these interesting relics of prehistoric times.
125. 16 U.S.C. §431 (1976).
126. The following dialogue is illustrative:
Mr. STEPHENS of Texas. Will that take this land off the market, or can they
still be settled as part of the public domain?
Mr. LACEY. It will take that portion of the reservation out of the market. It is
meant to cover the cave dwellers and cliff dwellers.
Mr. STEPHENS of Texas. How much land will be taken off the market in the
Western States by the passage of the bill?
Mr. LACEY. Not very much. The bill provides that it shall be the smallest area
necesstry [sic] for the care and maintenance of the objects to be preserved.
Mr. STEPHENS of Texas. Would it be anything like the forest-reserve bill, by
which seventy or eighty million acres of land in the United Staes have been tied
up?
Mr. LACEY. Certainly not. The object is entirely different. It is to preserve these
old objects of special interest and the Indian remains in the pueblos of the Southwest,
whilst the other reserves the forests and the water courses.
40 CONG. REC. 7888 (1906). The bill passed in 1906 was nearly identical to a bill passed in 1904
by the Senate (S. 5603) but omitted an amendment that appeared in the earlier bill limiting withdrawals
to one section (640 acres) of land in one place. See 30 CONG. REC. 5627 (1904).
127. See H. R. REP. NO. 2224, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, 7-8 (1905). See also S. DOC. NO.
314, 58th Cong., 2d Sess., 9-10 (1904).
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Monument was set aside in Arizona because it was "an object of unusual
scientific interest, being the greatest eroded canyon within the United
States."1 2 8 The United States later attempted to remoye an enterprising
mining claimant from a claim on the trailhead to the popular Bright Angel
Trail on the south rim of the Grand Canyon where he sought to charge
fees for access. When the claimant challenged the legality of the withdrawal, the Supreme Court in Cameron v. United States'29 upheld the
designation of Grand Canyon as a national monument. The Court found
that the canyon was of scientific interest, a purpose mentioned in the
statute. The one paragraph the court devoted to the issue did not deal
with the question of congressional intent or the language which seems to
limit the land area to be withdrawn, 3 ° nor were these matters fully developed in the briefs of the parties. 3 ' By the time of the Cameron decision,
at least nine other large national monuments had been set aside under the
Act to preserve various geological phenomena, not for protecting ruins
as contemplated by Congress.' 32
The Supreme Court considered another challenge to the President's
authority under the Antiquities Act in Cappaert v. United States.'33 A
rancher's pumping of groundwater had the effect of lowering the level
of water pooled in a nearby limestone cavern known as Devil's Hole, a
part of Death Valley National Monument. The federal government at128. Proc. No. 2022, 47 Stat. 2547 (1932).
129. 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
130. Id. at 455-56.
131. Appellants argued in their brief that the Grand Canyon National Monument was encompassed
within a prior forest reserve and that § I of the Antiquities Act protected objects of historic and
scientific interest on land already reserved. 16 U.S.C. § 433. Therefore, withdrawal under § 2 of
the Act (16 U.S.C. § 431) was unnecessary to insure protection of objects of historic and scientific
interest. Appellants also argued that the Grand Canyon was not a landmark, structure, or object of
historic or scientific interest but merely an enormous canyon and that the President's attempt to set
it apart as an object of unusual scientific interest merely because of its size was improper. Brief for
Appellant at 44-48, Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
The government responded that appellants' contentions about national monument status were not
raised in the Court of Appeals nor by the assignment of error to the Supreme Court, and thus were
not properly before the Court. It also argued that, in any event, the proclamation creating the Grand
Canyon National Monument stated that the canyon was an object of unusual scientific interest,
bringing it within the authority Congress granted to the President. Brief for Appellee at 23-24, id.
The question of whether the statute authorized such a large withdrawal was at issue in the case;
see United States v. Cameron, E. No. 10 (D. Ariz., answer filed March 23, 1917). The Court did
not address this question.
132. E.g., Proc. No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (Devil's Tower; 1152.91 acres); 36 Stat. 2498 (Mukuntuweap); Proc. No. 1126, 37 Stat. 1681 (Colorado; 13,883 acres); Proc. No. 1166, 37 Stat.
1715 (Devil's Postpile; 800 acres); 34 Stat. 3266 (Petrified Forest; 60,776.02 acres); Proc. No. 1340,
39 Stat. 1792 (Capulin Mountain; 680 acres); Proc. No. 1313, 39 Stat. 1752 (Dinosaur); Proc. No.
1487, 40 Stat. 1855 (Katmai; 1700 square miles); Proc. No. 1547, 41 Stat. 1779 (Scott's Bluff;
2053 acres). Approximately 5 to 15 national monuments were set aside yearly, many of them quite
small in size.
133. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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tempted to curtail the pumping to protect the Devil's Hole Pupfish, a rare
species living in the pool. The rancher and the State of Nevada resisted
on several grounds, including a contention that the Antiquities Act permitted the President to withdraw lands only to protect archaeological
sites. In a paragraph the Court dismissed the argument, pointing out that
the pool and the fish for which the monument was set aside were "objects
of historic or scientific interest."' 34 Although no reference was made to
administrative practice to support the government's interpretation of the
Act, it might have been pointed out that by 1976 use of the Antiquities
Act. for preservation of geological formations had become well established.
The most comprehensive treatment of the scope of executive authority
under the Antiquities Act was in a district court case arising in Wyo"' When John D. Rockefeller, Jr. offered to give the United States
ming. 35
over 33,000 acres in the majestic Grand Tetons in Wyoming, it was upon
the understanding that the area would be preserved and cared for by the
United States as a park. 36 Historically parks have been created only by
an act of Congress. 37 Consequently efforts to extend Grand Teton National
Park to include the Rockefeller lands were begun. Proposals for increasing
the park were defeated by strong local resistance to further reduction of
a tax base already thinned by a heavy concentration of nontaxable public
lands. 38 The state also objected that its control of fish and game, especially
revenue producing management of the elk herd, was frustrated by the
presence of large blocks of federal land. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
responded to an eighteen-year impasse in Congress by declaring 221,610
' Reacting strenuously,
acres to be the Jackson Hole National Monument. 39
Congress attached a provision to Interior Department appropriations bills
for several years following the proclamation which prohibited expenditures of the appropriations for administration of Jackson Hole National
Monument. 4 0
134. Id. at 141-42. The Presidential Proclamation setting aside the monument recited that its
purpose was "for the preservation of the unusual features of scenic, scientific, and educational
interest" and mentioned the fact that it was the habitat of "a peculiar race of desert fish ... which
is found nowhere else in the world." Proc. No. 2961, 3 C.F.R. § 147 (1979).
135. Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F.Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
136. See H.R. REP. NO. 2910, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
137. See 16 U.s .C. §§21-410gg-5 (1976). The executive has never attempted to create a national
park.
138. Less than 5% of the land in Teton County was taxable. H. R. REP. NO. 2910, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1950).
139. Proc. No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943). A large area that had been within the Teton National
Forest was also included in the monument.
140. E.g., ch. 219, §8, 57 Stat. 493 (1943); ch. 298, § 10, 58 Stat. 508 (1944); ch. 262, § 10,
59 Stat. 360 (1945); ch. 529, §9, 60 Stat. 386 (1946); ch. 337, §6, 61 Stat. 492 (1947); ch. 754,
1149 (1948); and ch. 680, § 110, 63 Stat. 801 (1949).
§6, 62 Stat.
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The State of Wyoming brought suit in federal district court charging
that the President had no authority to set aside the Grand Teton lands as
a national monument. Wyoming alleged that the area contained no object
of historic or scientific interest and that it had not been confined to the
smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of a
monument. The court upheld the President's creation of Jackson Hole
National Monument."'4 Although the terse proclamation cast little light
on the purposes of the monument,' 4 2 the government was allowed to
introduce evidence supportive of the President's action, such as the existence of trails and camps used in connection with early trapping and
hunting, glacial formations, mineral deposits, and indigenous plant life. "I
The court determined that there was enough evidence of historic and
scientific value to support a conclusion that the President had not acted
beyond his discretion.
The court in Wyoming v. Franke'4 recognized that the President's action
resulted in hardship and injustice to the state and seemed unpersuaded
as to the wisdom of his action.' 45 Nevertheless the court concluded that
the Antiquities Act had given the President authority to determine what
"objects" fall within the ambit of the legislation and to define the area
that is compatible with proper care and management of those objects ,
[11f the Congress presumes to delegate its inherent authority to Executive Departments which exercise acquisitive proclivities not actually intended, the burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial
legislation as may obviate any injustice brought about as the power
and control over and disposition of government lands inherently rests
in the Legislative branch.,6
Eventually Congress did restore some of the monument lands to Teton
National Forest, placing some in an elk refuge, and merging the rest with
Grand Teton National Park. 47 The Act also included provision for federal
payments in lieu of taxes and for federal cooperation in the state's fish
and game management. "' As if to note congressional displeasure with
Roosevelt's action and to assuage state fears of its repetition, the new
legislation prohibited any future use of the Antiquities Act in Wyoming. 149
141. Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F.Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
142. The proclamation addressed the statutory criteria briefly: "the Jackson Hole country . . .
contains historic landmarks and other objects of historic and scientific interest.
Proc. No.
2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943).
143. Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F.Supp. 890, 895 (D. Wyo. 1945).
144. Id.
145. Id.at 896-897.
146. Id.at 896.
147. Act of September 14, 1950, ch. 950, §§ 1-3, 64 Stat. 849 (1950).
148. Id.§§ 5-6.
149. Id. § 1.
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Congressional correction remains the most potent check on excesses
under the Antiquities Act. Short of a clear abuse of discretion, it appears
that the courts will not be lured into disputes that demand neat interpretations of the Act. Cameron's early, almost contemporaneous conclusion
that a behemoth geologic feature (Grand Canyon) could qualify as a
"monument" under the Act's language set the stage for an unrestrained
application of the Act by the executive. The Cameron court might have
insisted on reading the Act to be limited to small land areas required for
protection of archaeological objects. The decision instead concentrated
on other issues, perhaps reflecting the relative importance attached to
them by litigants. 5 o Deference to the administrative officials charged with
applying the statute is generally appropriate. But in Cameron the statute
was so new, its language sufficiently ambiguous, and administrative interpretations far enough from the clear intent of Congress that such easy
deference was unjustified. Nevertheless the Cameron decision seemed to
license a liberal use of the Antiquities Act to withdraw large blocks of
public land in the name of preserving "objects of historic or scientific
interest." Of course it is difficult to imagine lands that would not feed
some historic or scientific interest. 15
The Antiquities Act has had a profound impact in Alaska. There is a
long history of setting aside large national monuments there in areas
needing special protection.' 52 President Carter's 1978 action setting aside
millions of acres in Alaska as national monuments' 53 was in response to
Congress's failure to take action to protect national interest lands in Alaska
which, absent executive action, would have opened them to disposal and
development. '4 Carter noted that the lands "contain resources of unequaled scientific, historic, and cultural value, and include some of the
most spectacular scenery and wildlife in the world.""' The purpose of
150. See note 131 supra.
151. In Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F.Supp. 890, 895 (D. Wyo. 1945), the court had suggested that:
if a monument were to be created on a bare stretch of sage-brush prairie in regard
to which there was no substantial evidence that it contained objects of historic or
scientific interest, the action in attempting to establish it by proclamation as a
monument, would undoubtedly be outside the scope and purpose of the Monument
Act.
152. E.g., Katmai National Monument, established by Proc. No. 1487, 40 Stat. 1855 (1918)
(1700 square miles), enlarged by Proc. No. 1950, 47 Stat. 2453 (1931), Proc. No. 2564, 56 Stat.
1972 (1946), Proc. No. 8890, 83 Stat. 926 (1969), and Proc. No. 4619, 3 C.F.R. §86 (1979);
Glacier Bay National Monument, established by Proc. No. 1733, 43 Stat. 1988 (1925) (1820 square
miles), enlarged by Proc. No. 2330, 53 Stat. 2534 (1939) (904,960 acres), modified by Proc. No.
3889, 69 Stat., ch. 27 (1955), and Proc. No. 4618, 3 C.F.R. §84 (1979).
153. See note 118 supra.
154. See discussion of Alaska national interest lands withdrawals at notes 246-255 infra. The
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act was passed in 1980. It dealt with protection and
administration of the lands set aside as monuments by President Carter. Act of Dec. 2, 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980).
155. 14 WEEKLY COMP OF PRES. DOC. 2111 (Dec. 4, 1978).
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the withdrawals was to preserve fragile land areas intact for future legislation that would establish national parks, wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas. Yet the correctness of the actions must be judged not by
the purity of their motives but by their conformity with statute. While
the proclamations and the President's statements accompanying them
included much general language that more appropriately describes parks,
wildlife refuges, and other land management systems,' 56 there are plenty
that qualify for the historic and
of references to extraordinary
5 7 features
scientific rubrics of the Act.
Like the criterion in the Antiquities Act that requires areas proclaimed
as monuments to include "objects of historic or scientific interest," the
restriction on reserving lands in the monument "to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected" calls for an exercise of executive discretion. In Alaska immense
land areas had to be withdrawn in part because of the extent of the
"objects" being protected. As the President stated, among the areas to
be protected:
156. E.g.,
there are hereby set apart and reserved as the Admiralty Island National Monument
all lands, including submerged lands, and waters owned or controlled by the United
States within the boundaries of the area described . . . The area reserved consists
of approximately 1,100,000 acres, and is the smallest area compatible with the
proper care and management of the objects to be protected.
Proc. No. 4611, 3 C.F.R. §69 (1979);
The Secretary of the Interior shall promulgate such regulations as are appropriate,
including regulation of the opportunity to engage in a subsistence life-style by local
residents. The Secretary may close the national monument, or any portion thereof,
to subsistence uses of a particular fish, wildlife or plant population if necessary for
reasons of public safety, administration, or to ensure the natural stability or continued
viability of such population.
Proc. No. 4612, 3 C.F.R. §72 (1979). In addition, each of the Alaskan national monument withdrawals contain this provision:
All lands, including submerged lands, and all waters within the boundaries of this
monument are hereby appropriated and withdrawn from entry, location, selection,
sale or other disposition under the public lands laws, other than exchange.
Proc. Nos. 4611-27, 3 C.F.R. §§69-103 (1979).
157. E.g., Proc. No. 4611, 3 C.F.R. 69 (1979) states that Admiralty Island is "outstanding for
its superlative combination of scientific and historic objects," listing archaeological sites, cultural
history, and an ecology that includes a large population of nesting bald eagles, brown bears, and an
unspoiled coastal island ecosystem. Proc. No. 4612, 3 C.F.R. § 72 (1979), states that the Aniakchak
National Monument is valuable for its unique volcanic features, including one of the world's largest
calderas with a unique lake, examples of geological sequences and biological succession of plant
and animal species, and a unique, largely self-contained climate. Interacting with the caldera system
is a unique subsistence culture of local residents. Proc. No. 4617, 3 C.F.R. § 82 (1979) describes
Gates of the Arctic National Monument as both the site of "human habitation for approximately
7,000 years," and as an area that affords an excellent opportunity to study undisturbed communities
of animals and plants. Proc. No. 4627, 3 C.F.R. § 102 (1979) depicts Yukon Flats National Monument
as the largest Alaskan solar basin and as one of the continent's most productive habitats for wildlife
due to the pristine ecology of its lush wetlands.
A similar variety of qualities is cited in the other 1978 Alaska withdrawals.
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are the Nation's largest pristine river valley, the place where man
may first have come into the New World, a glacier as large as the
State of Rhode Island, and the largest group of peaks over 15,000
feet in North America. "8

So long as the historic or scientific nature of the area can be justified, a
decision to include a reasonable amount of surrounding territory would
seem to be within the scope of executive discretion that is shielded from
judicial disturbance. Indeed, once the executive determines that the Grand
Canyon or the Malaspina Glacier is worthy of protection, a decision to
include less than all of it within a national monument might be questioned
as an abuse of discretion.
The continued practice of making huge withdrawals under the Antiquities Act, like the executive's use of implied authority, has become its
own greatest vindication. By arrogation, authority to go well beyond the
Antiquities Act's original intent has become vested in the executive.
Congress has been aware of the executive's unfettered use of the Act. In
a few instances Congress's disapproval has resulted in a reversal of executive action.' 5 9 Although a sharp congressional response to the creation
of Jackson Hole National Monument led to the curtailment of the executive's authority in Wyoming under the Act, 160 the statute has not otherwise
been modified by Congress.' 61 Indeed, when Congress enacted FLPMA
in 1976 it left the Antiquities Act intact while repealing almost all other
sources of executive withdrawal authority. 162 This leads to a conclusion,
as in Midwest Oil, that Congress has impliedly approved, and thereby
effectively granted, the broad authority under the Act that the executive
has regularly exercised. Just as an implication of nonstatutory withdrawal
authority was built on undisturbed executive practice, a history of expansive interpretation of authority under the Antiquities Act has legitimated a broad construction.

158. 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 2111, 2112 (Dec. 4, 1978).
159. E.g., Jackson Hole National Monument was legislatively abolished and the lands merged
into other systems. See notes 147-149 supra and accompanying text. Grand Canyon National
Monument was included in a National Park by an act of Congress. Act of Jan. 3, 1975, § 3, 88
Stat. 2090, Pub. L. No. 93-620 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §228b (1976)).
160. See note 149 supra.
161. In reaction to the Alaska withdrawals under the Antiquities Act Congress curtailed executive
withdrawal authority in that state by limiting withdrawals of more than 5000 acres to 1year's duration
unless Congress approves by a joint resolution. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act,
Act of Dec. 2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 132b, 94 Stat. 2488 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 3213).
162. See notes 208-210 infra. It has been argued that the Antiquities Act is out of keeping with
the purposes of FLPMA and should be repealed. Comment, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the
Antiquities Act, 56 WASH. L. REV. 439 (1981).
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IV. WITHDRAWALS IN AN ERA OF PUBLIC LAND
STEWARDSHIP
A. Modern Land Policy
A rather abrupt shift of public land policy accompanied the closing of
the frontier around the turn of the century. As discussed above,' 63 the
focus on disposal of public lands to achieve national goals-expansion,
economic development, settlement of the continent-was changed as
manifest destiny was accomplished. Certain lands were to be preserved
to protect resources that might be needed by the nation-oil and gas,
other minerals, timber, water, wilderness and recreational areas. Instead
of wholesale repeals of the earlier laws allowing unrestrained private
exploitation of the public domain, antidotal laws were enacted to salvage
lands and resources that might be needed. A near crisis had prodded the
Taft administration to withdraw millions of acres of oil lands from appropriation under the public land laws. This in turn moved Congress to
enact the Pickett Act to facilitate future withdrawals, although the Court's
contemporary decision in Midwest Oil indicated that the President had
the necessary authority to make the withdrawal in that case without a
statute. In the same period Congress acted to protect other resources by
defining authority for administrative officials to make withdrawals and to
take other protective actions. "
It became clear early in the twentieth century that the public lands were
to be used and developed in a manner that ultimately would satisfy long
range national purposes. As the federal government's role changed from
a temporary guardian of lands and resources for eventual disposal, to a
trustee holding and managing property for the best interests of the citizenry, it became necessary to provide authority and direction to the officials who were in charge of the lands. Legislation supplied the framework
for administering public lands professionally and responsibly in apparent
recognition of the long term interests of the country in protecting and
utilizing particular resources. Public land management policy evolved
into a system of classification and management for particular uses. Management commands were included in the Forest Service Organic Act of
1897 that set up the Forest Service to manage the national forests.' 6 5 But
the most sweeping advance toward a system of federal land use planning
was enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934.166 This led to the
163.
164.
165.
166.
315r).

See
See
Act
Act

notes 7-30 supra, and accompanying text.
notes 31-44 supra, and accompanying text.
of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 34 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§473-481).
of June 18, 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§315-
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withdrawal of all public lands for classification. 67
' No uses, except mining
and mineral leasing, were allowed without the permission of the Bureau
of Land Management. Although budgets and skills were so limited that
the agency's authority to plan for and control land use could not be
exercised fully, significant depredations that were rampant in the past
could be prevented.
The modem trend in public land management is reflected in a host of
statutes requiring intensive management of federal resources by government officials. The statutes include mandates to protect certain land from
resource development. The earliest example is found in the mandate of
the National Park Organic Act of 1916.'68 Officials were directed to
manage the national parks "to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment
of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 169 Wilderness areas, "0
and to some extent national monuments, 7 ' are classified and managed
not to promote any conventional "use" but rather to preserve them in a
pristine state. This is done in the interests of science and history. It also
satisfies national psychological needs to commune with past and future
generations and pursues important aesthetic and emotional values. 7' 2 Thus
Congress has now made care of non-development resources such as recreation, wildlife, and wilderness an objective of public land management. 'I
Perhaps the general policy of demanding care and protection of federal
lands is best illustrated not by statutes dealing with lands specifically
167. A few months after the Act became law the President withdrew from "settlement, location,
sale or entry" all public lands in 12 western states. Exec. Order No. 6910, November 26, 1934.
This covered more than the 80 million acres of lands chiefly valuable for grazing that the statute
authorized to be included in grazing districts. Furthermore, the President also acted to withdraw all
public lands not otherwise reserved or withdrawn. Exec. Order No. 6964, February 5, 1935. These
executive orders may have been prudent, in that they prevented a land rush for the remaining public
lands. But even if the actions were legally authorized, the classification authority of the Secretary
was in doubt as to lands not covered by the 1934 Act. To remedy the situation Congress amended
the Act to grant the Secretary discretionary authority "to examine and classify any lands withdrawn
or reserved" under the two executive orders. Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 842, Title 1, § 2, 49 Stat.
1976. This amendment provided the authority for the secretary to determine what uses were proper
on the previously "wide open" public domain. See Utah v. Andrus, 446 U.S. 500 (1980).
168. 16 U.S.C. §1.
169. Id.
170. E.g., the Wilderness Act of 1964 defines a federal land area characterized as "wilderness"
as "an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without
permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve
its natural conditions.
... 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
171. See notes 111-117 supra and accompanying text.
172. See Wilderness Symposium, 16 IDAHO L. REV. 379-535 (1980); M. McCloskey, The
Wilderness Act of 1964-Its Background and Meaning, 45 ORE. L. REV. 288 (1966).
173. See Wilkinson, Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, I PUB.
LAND L. REV. 1, 36 (1980).
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targeted for preservation but by those which govern use of lands that are
to remain available for resource development. The national forests and
the lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management comprise
most of the public lands 74 and continue to be available for grazing, timber
harvesting, and mineral exploration and development as well as for wildlife habitat and recreation. Yet today administration of lands for these
purposes is controlled by statutes'7 5 and is markedly different from management during the period of disposal of the public lands. The most
comprehensive statutes are the Federal Land Policy and Management
"' and the National Forest Management Act.' 77
Act 76
Public land managers are now required by statutes to consider all of
the "multiple uses" to which an area might be adapted,' 78 to impose fees
for uses permitted to private parties, to engage in land use planning, 7 9
and to involve the public in decisionmaking.' 8 0 These mandates evidence
a congressional purpose to impose guidelines and limits on federal agencies in order to prevent unwise use or dissipation of public resources.
Without necessarily removing federal lands from availability for private
uses, Congress has required prudence in management, the kind of prudence that is exercised by a manager who must consider the public resources
not merely as commodities to be expended for today's needs but as assets
to be retained indefinitely and used for the benefit of future, as well as
of present, generations.
In addition to statutes dealing with general management of the public
lands, Congress has, through the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)," ' superimposed upon the statutory mission of every federal
174. In 1970 BLM and Forest Service land included over 85% of all public lands. PLLRC
REPORT, supra note 7, Appendix F at 327-328. Since the enactment of the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act, Act of Dec. 2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, much land
formerly managed by BLM will be under the management of other agencies.
175. See 16 U.S.C. §§528-531, 1600, 1601, 1602, 1604;43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1712, 1713, 1714.
176. Act of October 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 17011782 and scattered sections of Titles 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 48 and 49 U.S.C.). See section IV
B infra.
177. Act of October 22, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 16001610 and scattered sections of Title 16 U.S.C.).
178. 16 U.S.C. §§528, 529, 531(a), 1600(3), 1601(d), 1604(e)(1), 1607; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7),
1712(c)(1), 1732(a). See Whaley, Multiple Use Decision Making-Where Do We Go From Here?
10 NAT. RES. J. 557 (1970); Strand, Statutory Authority Governing Management of the National
Forest System-Time for a Change? 7 NAT. RES. J. 479 (1974); Dunsky, Improved Policymaking
for the Multiple Use of Public Lands, 5 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 485 (1972); Comment, Managing
the Federal Lands: Replacing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE L. J. 787 (1973).
179. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d), (f), (g), (i); 43 U.S.C. § 1712. See also Forest and Rangelands
Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, which requires long range planning and research
programs for the management, use and protection of Forest Service lands. 16 U.S.C. § 1601,
amending Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476.
180. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600(3), 1601(c), 1604(d), 1612, 1643(c); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(f). See note 200
infra.
181. 42 U.S.C. §§4331-4361.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

agency an obligation to assess the environmental impacts of any "proposals for . . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment." 81 2 The stated purpose of the Act is "to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements
of present and future generations of Americans."' 8 3 Enforceable obligations under NEPA seem to be limited to those concerning the preparation
of environmental impact statements consistent with the Act's standards.
The prerequisite of an impact statement may be avoided only if it would
pose a clear and unavoidable conflict with other statutory obligations" 5
or if the agency involved exercises no discretion in the matter.1 6 Consequently land management agencies have adopted appropriate regulations'87
and regularly must prepare environmental impact statements. 88
'
182. Id. at §4332(2)(c). It has been held that NEPA "makes environmental protection part of
the mandate of every federal agency and department." Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc.
v. Atomic Energy Commission, 419 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Accord, Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974) (NEPA supplements Secretary of Interior's
powers under Taylor Grazing Act). See also 42 U.S.C. §§4333 (all agencies required to bring their
regulations, policies and procedures into conformity with NEPA's purposes), and § 4334 (NEPA's
policies and goals are to supplement existing authorizations of federal agencies).
Among NEPA's other requirements, agencies must: use "a systematic, interdisciplinary approach
...in planning and in decisionmaking;" "identify and develop methods and procedures ... which
will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations;" "study, develop,
and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal that involves
unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources;" and "initiate and utilize
ecological information in the planning and development of resource-oriented projects." 42 U.S.C.
§4332(2)(A), (B), (E), and (H) (1976).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976).
184. See Stryckers Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
185. E.g., Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976) (statutory time
limit for federal action too short to allow for EIS preparation); Texas Comm. on Natural Resources
v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978) (legislative history of
National Forest Management Act set forth standards for clear-cutting in national forests during period
while permanent regulations were being developed).
186. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir., 1979)
(preference right coal lease must be granted to holder of prospecting permit if statutory requirements
met; it cannot depend on preparation of EIS); South Dakota v. Andrus, 462 F.Supp. 905 (D. S.D.
1978), affirmed, 614 F.2d 1190 (1980) (no EIS required for patent to mining claim because issuance
is nondiscretionary).
187. 7 C.F.R. § 3100 (Department of Agriculture), 18 C.F.R. § 707 (Water Resources Council),
43 C.F.R. § 3040 (Bureau of Land Management). See 40 C.F.R. part 1500 (regulations applying
generally to NEPA compliance).
188. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir., 1979)
(Mineral Lands Leasing Act); Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.
1979) (Mineral Lands Leasing Act); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp.
981 (D. D.C. 1977) (federal coal leasing program). But see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
(1976) (agency has discretion to determine when a "proposal" exists); Friends of the Earth v. Butz,
406 F.Supp. 742 (D. Mont. 1975) (agency's determination of whether EIS is required is necessarily
governed by rule of reason).
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B. The FederalLand Policy and Management Act.
The conservation trend-insistence upon sound management of public
lands and selective preservation-grew throughout the first three quarters
of the 20th century. Public land laws were exhaustively reviewed by the
Public Land Law Review Commission and the commission's conclusions
were reported in 1970.189 The report contained 137 principal recommendations and hundreds of other, lesser recommendations. Much commentary, discussion, and criticism followed issuance of the report, 90 but
Congress took no action to implement the recommendations for five years.
Finally, with the enactment of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA)' 91 many of the
recommendations in the report, or variations
19 2
upon them, were adopted.
A dominant theme in the Public Land Law Review Commission's report
was the assertion of the public's interest in public resources. Although
the 19th century motif of distributing public lands to private individuals
and encouraging their private development had become largely outmoded,
the vast majority of lands owned by the public were being managed with
little direction from Congress. Congress expressly repudiated the old
policy, declaring it to be federal policy that "the public lands be retained
in Federal ownership" unless it is found through the FLPMA land planning
procedures that disposal of certain parcels "will serve the national interest. "1
Before the FLPMA was enacted, the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), steward of about 60% of the public domain, was confined to
antiquated management systems by limited budgets and lack of congres189. PLLRC REPORT, supra note 7.
190. See, Symposium Presentingan Analysis of the Public Land Law Review Commission Report,
6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1-457 (1970); 54 DEN. L. J. 383-664 (1977); Hagerstein, One Third
of the Nation's Land-Evolution of a Policy Recommendation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 56 (1972);
Hillhouse, Public Land Law Review Commission Report: Ice-Breaking in Reserved Waters, 4 NAT.
RESOURCES L. 368 (1971); Muys, Environmental Recommendations of the Public Land Law
Review Commission and Their Implementation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES L. 271 (1972).
191. Act of October 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 17011782 and scattered sections of Titles 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 48 and 49 U.S.C.).
192. See Carver, FederalLand Policy and ManagementAct of 1976: Fruition or Frustration,54
DEN. L. J. 387 (1977); Muys, The Public Land Law Review Commission Impact on the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 301 (1979). Muys (at 307) points
out that many commission recommendations not addressed by FLPMA were addressed in other
legislation around the same time. E.g., Public Rangelands Improvement Act, Act of October 25,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803; Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, Act of
September 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629; National Forest Management Act, Act of
October 22, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949; Act of October 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94565, 90 Stat. 2662 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607) (providing for federal payments in lieu of
local taxes); Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Act of August 4, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-377, 90 Stat. 1083.
193. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(l).
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sional direction. Other land management agencies had the benefit of
somewhat better resources and guidelines.' 94 Until the enactment of the
FLPMA, BLM had no organic act and had to grope through a maze of
congressional enactments, resolving contradictions and filling gaps in its
agency mission by divining the congressional will as expressed through
the most recent legislation.
The FLPMA attempted to bring federal land management into the 20th
century by insisting upon greater responsibility and managerial regularity.
Better land use planning and management were sought by providing for
inventories and for comprehensive land use plans. 95 Congress directed
the use of criteria' 96 that show an overriding concern for better protection
of federal resources. 9' 7 Procedures were set out for acquisitions, sales,
and exchanges of public lands."'9 Detailed provisions specified how the
Bureau of Land Management is to be administered, 9 9 and public participation was built into many of the bureau's activities. 2' The Act affirmed
a national interest in maintaining a supply of domestic resources and
stated that the public lands -should be managed consistently with that
goal, 20 ' and with the goals of the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of
1970.202 But there were scant practical directives in the Act to carry out
194. E.g., Forest Service, Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34-36 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§473-482, 551 (1976)); Bureau of Reclamation, Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388
(codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 391, 411, 1457); National Park Service, Act of August 25, 1916, ch. 408,
39 Stat. 535 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3, 22, 43); Fish and Wildlife Service, Act of August 8,
1956, ch. 1036, 70 Stat. 1119 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §742(a)).
195. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711, 1712 (1976).
196. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (1976).
197. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(3) provides that the Secretary shall "give priority to the designation
and protection of areas of critical environmental concern," and § 1712(c)(6) requires him to "consider
the relative scarcity of the values involved and the availability of alternative means (including
recycling) and sites for realization of those values."
198. 43 U.S.C. § 1715 (acquisitions), § 1713 (sales), and § 1716 (exchanges).
199. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1731-1748 (1976).
200. E.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(f), 1714(h) (1976). Involvement of the public in hearings, debates,
reports, etc. was heralded by commentators as the most effective means of furthering the public
interest. E.g., Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forests, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 403-406 (1962).
Greater public participation in public land management was urged in the report of the Public Land
Law Review Commission. See PLLRC REPORT, supra note 7, at 256. See generally, Achterman
and Fairfax, The Public Participation Requirements of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1979).
201. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(12). Another section of the Act states that "except as provided in
[specified sections] and in the last sentence of this paragraph, no provision of this section or any
other section of this Act shall in any way amend the Mining Law of 1872 or impair the rights of
" 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). The exceptions seem to have a
any locators of claims under that Act ..
potential for swallowing much of the saving language. This is especially true of the "last sentence"
referred to, which reads: "In managing the public lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise,
take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands." Id.
202. 30 U.S.C. § 21a. The Act declares it to be in the national interest to foster private enterprise
in developing an "economically sound and stable" mining industry, in mining research, in development of domestic minerals, and in disposal and reclamation of mineral waste.

April 19821

MANAGING THE PUBLIC LANDS

these purposes; the dominant theme was prudent, conservative management.2 °3 Indeed, in a number of respects practices under the 1872 General
Mining Law 2" were restricted or modified, 2 5 and the Act included among
its most extensive and specific provisions measures for the preservation
of environmental values which often conflict with resource development. 21 It is in this context that the Act's provisions concerning executive
withdrawals must be considered.
20 7
Taking a cue from the Public Land Law Review Commission's report,
Congress sought to deal with some of the mysteries of executive withdrawal authority. With extraordinary precision, Congress expressly repealed the President's implied delegation of authority, specifically citing
Midwest Oil in the statute, 20 8 and repealed 29 statutory provisions for
executive withdrawal authority.209 Consequently only a few statutes granting executive withdrawal authority remained intact.210
As discussed above, Midwest Oil did not decide the validity of postPickett Act withdrawals. The FLPMA preserves all withdrawals "in effect" at the time of its enactment but does not purport to validate or cure
defects in attempted withdrawals that suffered from a legal defect. 2 ' It
203. One court has said that the Secretary's rulemaking authority contained in the Act is extensive
enough to authorize any regulations upon the use of the public lands so long as they are "reasonably
related to the broad concerns for the management of public lands set forth in FLPMA." Topaz
Beryllium Co. v. United States, 649 F.2d 775, 779 (10th Cir. 1981).
204. See note 16 supra.
205. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b), 1744, 1781(f), 1782. See note 201 supra.
206. E.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(8), 1702(c), 1712(c)(2), 1712(c)(3), 1712(c)(6), 1712(c)(8),
1732.
207. PLLRC REPORT, supra note 7 at 54-57. The Commission's Recommendation 8 stated:
Large scale limited or single use withdrawals of a permanent or indefinite term
should be accomplished only by act of Congress. All other withdrawal authority
should be expressly delegated with statutory guidelines to insure proper justification
for proposed withdrawals, provide for public participation in their consideration,
and establish criteria for Executive action.
At 54.
208. Effective on and after the date of approval of this Act, the implied authority of the
President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting from acquiescence of the
Congress (U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459) and the following statutes and
parts of statutes are repealed. ...
Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2744, 2792 (1976).
209. Id.
210. I.e., the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§431 el seq., the Fish and Game Sanctuaries Act, 16
U.S.C. § 694; the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq.; the Defense Withdrawal Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 155 el seq.; and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 88 1610(a)(3),
1615(d)(1), 1616(d) (the authority of each, with the possible exception of § 1616(d)(1), has expired.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1621(h)).
211. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(c) states:
All withdrawals, reservations, classifications, and designations in effect as of the
date of approval of this Act shall remain in full force and effect until modified under
the provisions of this Act or other applicable law.
If an invalid withdrawal is discovered, the land can be withdrawn anew under the FLPMA procedures.
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to be reviewed by the
does require a substantial number of withdrawals
22
Secretary and either revoked or continued.
Most of the millions of acres that have been withdrawn are subject to
the law as it existed before October 21, 1976, the FLPMA effective date.
Therefore future challenges to withdrawals made after the Pickett Act
and before the enactment of FLPMA may be expected.2 3 While challengers may argue that the Pickett Act itself extinguished the authority
found in Midwest Oil, the fact that Congress saw fit to repeal the President's "implied authority" under Midwest Oil suggests that the authority
had not been extinguished by the Pickett Act. There would have been no
reason for the repealer unless Congress assumed that implied authority
survived the Pickett Act; Midwest Oil had dealt with the issue only in a
pre-Pickett Act context. Even if the Pickett Act extinguished the PresiSee notes 226-235 infra and accompanying text. But this would not be effective to defeat established
rights, e.g., claims perfected under the mining law. Exercises of secretarial authority under the Act
are to be "subject to valid existing rights." Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, §701(h)
(reprinted in note following 43 U.S.C. § 1701). Although "claims" are something less than "rights,"
Stockley v. United States, 200 U.S. 532, 544 (1923) (dictum), it has been held that dedication of
public land to uses inconsistent with a mining claim can result in government liability for damages.
United States v. North American Transp. v. Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
212. The Act directs the Secretary of the Interior to review within fifteen years existing withdrawals
from mining or mineral leasing of Bureau of Land Management and Forest Service lands, and all
withdrawals of certain lands administered by other agencies, in the eleven Western states. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1714(e)(1). The Secretary then is to report to the President recommendations concerning continuation of the withdrawals. The President in turn reports his recommendations to Congress. The
Secretary then can terminate any withdrawals that were not made by Congress unless Congress
objects by a concurrent resolution within 90 days. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(l)(2).
As of the end of fiscal year 1981, 233 withdrawals covering about 20.4 million acres had been
revoked. Most of the lands had been closed to mineral leasing, mining location or both. U.S.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Division of Land Resources and Realty,
Withdrawal Review Year End Report, October 16, 1981. Some withdrawals not required to be
reviewed by §204(l) of FLPMA (43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1)) were revoked. Apparently none of the
revocations were made according to the prescribed procedures for referral of the Secretary's recommendations for continuation or termination of withdrawals. The office of the Solicitor for the
Department of the Interior has taken the position that FLPMA in § 204(a) provides the Secretary
with independent revocation authority. See Memorandum from Associate Solicitor. Energy and
Resources to Assistant Secretary, Land and Water Resources, Oct. 30, 1980. Section 204(a) states
that "[Tihe Secretary is authorized to make, modify, extend or revoke withdrawals but only in
accordance with the provisions and limitations of this section." The memorandum points out that
the provision of § 204(l) had its origin in a section of a predecessor bill separate from § 204(a).
Furthermore, § 204(l) says that "the Secretary may act to terminate withdrawals other than those
made by Act of Congress in accordance with the recommendations of the President . . ." (emphasis
added). The Associate Solicitor's memorandum attaches great significance to the difference in terminology. Having treated the authority in §§ 204(a) and 204(l) distinctly, the memorandum argues
that a withdrawal reviewed under § 204(l) can be revoked under either section. The argument is
plausible with respect to withdrawals that were ouside the required review process of § 204(1) (even
if they are, in fact, reviewed), but for those that are within the purview of § 204(l) the most reasonable
construction is that § 204(a) authority to revoke is not available. By its terms § 204(a) authority is
restricted by "the provisions and limitations of this section [204]."
213. Portland General Electric Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F.Supp. 859 (D. Wyo. 1977) is the only such
challenge brought so far. It was unsuccessful. See notes 99-104 supra and accompanying text.
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dent's earlier implied delegation of authority, it could be argued that
Congress has since acquiesced in post-Pickett Act withdrawals, giving
rise to a new grant of authority. It might be urged that this authority was
not extinguished by the repealer. The argument is not untenable, but it
seems inconsistent with Congress's apparent intent. The most plausible
interpretation of the repealer, supported by the legislative history, 1 4 is
that it extinguished all implied authority that existed in 1976 and that the
citation to Midwest Oil was not intended to limit it to pre-Pickett Act
authority. By the time FLPMA was passed, many assumed that the Pickett
Act did not limit executive withdrawal authority." 5 In any event, in the
FLPMA Congress may simply have been rejecting all impliedly delegated
withdrawal authority and used the citation to Midwest Oil to illustrate
21 6
rather than to limit the type of authority being repealed.
Having repealed most of the authority of the executive to make withdrawals, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act vested the executive with broad new withdrawal authority, subject to certain procedural
requirements.21 7 The authority was delegated not to the President, but
directly to the Secretary of Interior.2"' The purposes for withdrawals were
articulated for the first time in a new, functional definition, 1 9 and statutory
procedures were engaged for a wide range of administrative actions that
fall within the definition of a "withdrawal" and which are not undertaken
in the exercise of independent authority to control the public lands.22 °
214. See, e.g., H. R. REP. NO. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprinted in [19761
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6175, 6183 (indicating the Act would, "with certain exceptions
. . . repeal all existing law relating to executive authority to create, modify, and terminate withdrawals
and reservations"). Charles L. Wheatley, Jr., the leading authority on public land withdrawals,
reaches the conclusion "that FLPMA bars all claims of implied authority in the Executive as far as
Congress is concerned." Wheatley, Withdrawals Under the Federal Land Policy Management Act
of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 319 (1979).
215. E.g., 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (1941) discussed at notes 77-98 supra.
216. Arguments that there is some non-statutory authority for withdrawals outside the FLPMA
may be raised again. Should the executive embark on a program of non-FLPMA withdrawals that
is not checked by Congress, the Midwest Oil rationale could be regenerated.
217. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1714(a)-1714(l) (1976). Final regulations implementing the provisions have
been published. 46 Fed. Reg. 22,585 (1981) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. §§ 2200, 2300, 2920).
218. Presidential authority had long been delegated to and exercised by the Secretary of the
Interior. Exec. Order No. 10,355, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831 (1952); Exec. Order No. 9337, 8 Fed. Reg.
5516 (1943); Exec. Order No. 9146, 7 Fed. Reg. 3067 (1942).
219. 43 U.S.C. § 17020) defines "withdrawal" as:
withholding an area of Federal land from settlement, sale, location, or entry, under
some or all of the general land laws, for the purpose of limiting activities under
those laws in order to maintain other public values in the area or reserving the area
for a particular public purpose or program; or transferring jurisdiction over an area
of Federal land, other than "property" governed by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, as amended from one department, bureau or agency to
another department, bureau or agency.
220. The Secretary often may choose from several sources of authority in deciding to restrict
activities on the public land. See notes 261-267 infra and accompanying text.
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Few substantive restrictions were imposed. For instance, there was no
restriction on removing lands from entry under the mining laws as in the
Pickett Act. Indeed, the Secretary was expressly granted all of the authority that the executive possessed under its formerly implied delegation
of authority. But Congress prescribed procedures and considerations to
regulate the exercise of the Secretary's authority.21' This was intended to
regularize administrative practice that had in the past been used to effect
withdrawals which were "not always in the best interest of all the people. ''222
The FLPMA withdrawal procedures were expected to achieve better
"balance" between "public concern over the possibility of excessive
disposals of public lands on the one hand and excessive restrictions on
the other.",223 First, the Secretary was directed to take certain factors into
224
account and follow specified procedures in effecting a withdrawal.
Second, the Secretary was required to report withdrawals to the Congress
which225may then reverse his decisions by following a simplified procedure.
The applicable procedures under FLPMA depend on the amount of
land withdrawn and the urgency of the need for protective action. Small
221. The administrative practices and regulations that
applied towithdrawals before enactment
of the FLPMA were found at 43 C.F.R. part 2351. They are described in Strauss, Rules, Adjudications,
and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department's
Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1249-53 (1974) and Moran, Withdrawals and the Mineral Landman, 16 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 757, 773-83 (1971).
222. H. R. REP. NO. 1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6175.
223. Id. at3, reprinted in[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6177.
224. See notes 226-235 infra and accompanying text. The Secretary may segregate land from
the operation of any or all of the public land laws for up to two years while it is being considered
for withdrawal. Segregation may be made by publishing a notice in the Federal Register indicating
that a withdrawal is being considered. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b)(1).
The procedures for making withdrawals prior to FLPMA were similar but far less detailed. See
43 C.F.R. part 2351 (1980). The regulations for withdrawals under FLPMA are found at 43 C.F.R.
part 2300 (1981).
225. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1). The procedure for congressional veto is designed to avoid roadblocks
that
can normally inhibit
or prevent legislation. Congress has only 90 days toact,
and after
30 days
a motion may be made todischarge a resolution from a committee that has not acted on it.
Itis
then inorder tomove tointroduce the resolution on the floor.
Floor debate islimited to one hour,
and themotion may not be amended.
The language of the provision is fraught with interpretive problems. For instance, § 1714(c)(1)
states that the withdrawal will be ineffective "if the Congress has adopted a concurrent resolution
stating that such House does not approve the withdrawal" (emphasis added). This inconsistency
within the section is probably owing to haste in preparing the final version of the bill. The device
of a veto by concurrent resolution was adopted by the Conference Committee in lieu of the House
bill's provision for veto by either house of Congress. Another internal inconsistency arises from the
section's reference to "the Presidential recommendation" while the power to make recommendations
was given expressly to the Secretary of Interior. This probably arises from the fact that the entire
section with regard to expediting the consideration of a resolution by Congress was added by the
Conference Committee's adoption of the language of what is now § 1714(l) (providing for expedited
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withdrawals-those aggregating less than 5,000 acres-may be set aside
without restriction so long as they are for a "resource use. "" 6 Withdrawals
for proprietary purposes, such as sites for administrative buildings or
facilities, may be made for up to twenty years.22 7 Small withdrawals may
also be made to preserve the lands for a use being considered by Congress,
congressional review of presidential recommendations with regard to existing withdrawals; see note
212 supra.
Congressional vetoes have been employed increasingly in recent legislation. Their propriety can
be questioned as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine in that it may allow usurpation of
the constitutional allocation of decisionmaking authority. E.g., Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and
the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978); McGowan, Congress,
Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1977); Bruff and Gellhorn,
Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation; A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1369 (1977).
Specific objections to the legislative veto include: 1.It may deprive the executive of its constitutional power faithfully to execute the laws provided for in art. 11,section 3; 2. It may deprive the
executive of the ability to consider and approve or veto legislation provided for in Art. I, section
7; 3. It may deprive the judiciary of the authority to determine cases and controversies provided by
Art. Ill, section 2 which, as implemented by Congress, allows review of agency decisions (e.g.,
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706); 4. If only one house can override a particular
action, the principle of bicameralism expressed in Art. I, section 1 may be offended. See Chadha
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), prob. juris noted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3244 (Oct. 6, 1981) (holding unconstitutional 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) which allows a one
house resolution to disapprove an agency suspension of a deportation order) and Consumer Energy
Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, No. 80-2184 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 1982)
(holding unconstitutional § 202(c) of the Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3342(c) which provides
for one house veto resolution of rules for incremental pricing in natural gas deregulation).
Whether a court upholds or rejects specific legislative veto provisions may depend upon the extent
to which the legislative branch has attempted to involve itself in enforcement or interpretation of
laws, as opposed to its constitutional function of making laws. Thus, a delegated legislative function
may be susceptible to a greater degree of retained authority to manipulate agency decisions than a
function that is essentially judicial or administrative. As discussed earlier, authority to withdraw
public lands is rooted in Congress's power under the Property Clause, Art. IV, section 3, clause 2.
In the past, the power has been impliedly delegated to the executive, but the FLPMA dealt specifically
with the terms on which such authority would be delegated and exercised in the future. Assuming
the Courts of Appeals' decisions in Chadha and Consumer Energy Council supra, are upheld, the
device in 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) for congressional disapproval of executive withdrawals by concurrent resolution nevertheless may be constitutional. Congress may have broader authority to oversee
the exercise of legislative power it has delegated to the executive than it has to oversee executive
enforcement of the laws made by Congress. Thus, decisions to withdraw public lands, encompassed
within the authority of the Property Clause, are more appropriately reserved for legislative oversight
than are decisions involving individual deportations that have been made in the course of administering
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (enacted under Congress's power "To establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization" in Art. I, section 8, cl.
4). Decisions setting particular rate structures under
the Natural Gas Policy Act (enacted under the commerce power, Art. 1,section 8, cl.3) present a
closer question in that they may establish a nationally applicable legislative policy, a function less
likely to offend separation of powers principles. See also note 243 infra, discussing 43 U.S.C.
§ 1714(e), a provision of the FLPMA under which the Secretary of the Interior is directed to withdraw
lands upon a determination of emergency by a committee of either house.
226. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d)(1) (1976). Given the coverage of other subsections of § 1714(d),
"resource uses" must refer to those uses listed in § 1702(c), namely "recreation, range, timber,
minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical values."
227. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d)(2) (1976).
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but they are limited to five years duration. 228 As with larger withdrawals,
the FLPMA requires that public hearings be held prior to a small withdrawal order.229
Withdrawals of significant size-those 5,000 acres and larger-may
be made for up to 20 years for any purpose.23 ° Whenever acting under
this provision the Secretary must notify both houses of Congress that a
withdrawal is being made and furnish extensive information to the relevant
committee of each house. The required information includes the essential
" ' environmental and economic facfacts concerning the withdrawal, 23
tors, consideration of impacts on other existing and potential uses, 235
234
and opportunities for public participation.
intergovernmental effects,
The Acts' requirement of a thorough assessment of the matters listed
in Section 204(a)(2) of the FLPMA is reminiscent of the requirement in
NEPA that an environmental impact statement accompany proposals of
a federal agency that would have a significant effect on the human environment.236 Presumably, an agency forced to identify and consider certain factors will not ignore them in formulating a decision. Yet, as under
NEPA, the agency need not reach a particular decision flowing from the
information it considers. 37 And, as with NEPA decisionmaking, the lack
228. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d)(3) (1976).
229. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(h) (1976).
230. 43 USE § 1714 (c)(1) (1976). Five thousand acres was the limit of executive withdrawal
authority under the Defense Withdrawal Act, 43 U.S.C. § 156 (1976). The legislative history of that
Act indicates that this size was selected because "[tiestimony of witnesses for the Department of
the Interior made it clear that the great majority of individual applications for any one project or
facility in fact involve lands of less than 5,000 acres, . . . and the Department of Defense in its
report does not object to this section of the act." S. REP. NO. 857, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1957),
reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2227, 2240.
231. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2)(1), (9), (12) (1976).
232. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2)(2) (1976).
233. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2)(3)-(6) (1976).
234. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2), (7), (8) (1976).
235. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2), (10), (11) (1976).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). See notes 181-188 supra and accompanying text. Satisfying
this provision does not render compliance with NEPA's requirement of an environmental impact
statement (EIS) unnecessary. A withdrawal constituting a major federal action that will have a
significant effect on the environment must still be accompanied by an EIS. But cf. Alaska v. Carter,
462 F.Supp. 1155 (D. Alas. 1978) (NEPA's requirements may be avoided to the extent that time
constraints of an emergency withdrawal would prevent full compliance.) See also Forest and Range
Land Renewable Resources Planning Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1676 (1976). (Secretary of Agriculture
to consider physical, biological, economic and other factors in developing resource management
plans for the National Forests).
There is a potential for duplication among FLPMA's informational requirements for withdrawals,
NEPA's EIS requirement, and requisites of the Renewable Resources Planning Act. Duplication may
be minimized by combined reporting, which seems to be contemplated in the Council on Environmental Quality regulations under NEPA, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.2(c), 1500.4(k), 1502.25 (1981).
237. Under NEPA, an agency must show that it had information on the relevant factors listed in
§ 102(2)(c) (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976)), but if the record shows that the factors were considered,
the courts will not overturn an agency's decision. E.g., in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc.
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of substantive direction in the statute makes unlikely any judicial reversal
of an agency decision that may seem unwise in light of the information
produced.238 So long as the procedural requirements in the FLPMA are
followed 23 9 and the information furnished to Congress is adequate, it is
predictable that a court would refuse to set aside the action. 24 ° Only if
the withdrawal decision is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious is a judicial challenge likely to succeed.24'
The procedures and limitations for significant withdrawals may be
avoided regardless of the size of a proposed withdrawal in an "emergency." Any time the Secretary of Interior determines that "extraordinary
measures must be taken to preserve values that would otherwise be lost,"
v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court said:
Thus the general substantive policy of the Act . . . leaves room for a responsible
exercise of discretion and may not require particular substantive results in particular
problematic instances. However, the Act also contains very important 'procedural'
provisions-provisions which are designed to see that all federal agencies do in fact
exercise the substantive discretion given them.
In Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980), the Court said
"the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences;
it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action
to be taken,' " citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21 (1976).
238. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980). There the Court
reversed a court of appeals' finding that environmental factors should be given determinative weight,
holding that NEPA imposes duties that are essentially procedural. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978), in which the Court
stated that "if courts continually review agency proceedings to determine whether the agency employed procedures which were, in the court's opinion, perfectly tailored to reach what the court
perceives to be the 'best' or 'correct' result, judicial review would be totally unpredictable." The
Court then observed that "the only procedural requirements imposed by NEPA are those stated in
the plain language of the Act." Id. at 548.
239. Cf. Mountains States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F.Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980) (prohibition against mineral leasing of lands subject to wilderness classification study was tantamount
to "withdrawal" and thus invalid unless FLPMA procedures followed); see discussion in note 267
infra.
240. It may be argued that the requirement of furnishing information to Congress in 43 U.S.C.
§ 1714(d)(2) is for the benefit of Congress alone, not the public and therefore standing should be
denied to a member of the public challenging the adequacy of the information. But informed public
participation is a value that pervades the Act. See Achterman and Fairfax, The Public Participation
Requirements of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1979).
Therefore litigants may have a sufficient stake in the process to be within the zone of interests
protected by the Act. See Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe R.R. v. Callaway, 431 F.Supp. 722, 727
(D.D.C. 1977) (private parties have standing to challenge impact statement prepared under NEPA
for a legislative proposal because purpose was not only to inform Congress but also to inform the
public and foster meaningful public participation).
241. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 88 701-706 (1976), provides for judicial review
of agency action unless such review is prohibited by statute or committed to agency discretion by
law (§ 701). The scope of review is described in § 706, which allows the reviewing court, among
other things, to set aside agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not
in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). These standards are discussed in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 549-555 (1978).
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a withdrawal is to be made immediately. 2 2 The chairman of the relevant
committee of the House or Senate also can trigger mandatory emergency
withdrawals by notifying the Secretary that an appropriate situation exists. 243 Emergency withdrawals may last a maximum of three years and
may not be renewed except by following the procedures for withdrawals
under other provisions of the FLPMA. The full informational report
required when significant withdrawals are made must follow the making
of emergency withdrawals within 90 days.244
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act's emergency withdrawal
authority was used to set aside over 100 million acres in Alaska in 1978.245
Congress had anticipated legislation to create several parks, forests, wildlife refuges and wild and scenic rivers, largely out of lands that it had
directed the Secretary of Interior to withdraw under section 17(d)(2) of
the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). 246 To the extent
242. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e). Notice is to be given to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate.
The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (named in the Act) was replaced by the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources effective February 11, 1977.
243. This procedure could be subject to some of the same objections that are made to the
congressional veto device employed by the FLPMA in the case of executive withdrawals. See note
225, supra. It substitutes a hybrid decisionmaking procedure for those processes established in the
Constitution, potentially disrupting the system of institutional decisionmaking and the checks and
balances intended by the framers. But delegation of authority to a congressional committee to prompt
emergency withdrawals by an executive official might be sustained on the ground that it is necessary
in aid of legislation that may be proposed or subject to investigation. It is well established that
Congress may exercise powers normally exercised by other branches when ancillary to its legislative
functions. E.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (power to investigate and to subpoena
witnesses). Cf. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 16 E.R.C. 1825 (D. Mont. 1981). In that case
the court held that a FLPMA withdrawal under 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) could be validly forced by a
resolution finding an emergency situation passed by the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs but that the committee had no power under the statute to prescribe the scope and duration
of the withdrawal. Because the disposition set aside the specific order of withdrawal as being based
on an invalid direction of the House Committee, it did not reach the constitutional question, but it
stated in dicta that the section would pass constitutional muster only if the court's interpretation of
the committee's authority were correct. If the committee wielded greater authority, it would violate
separation of powers principles. The case apparently involves the first attempt by a congressional
committee to force a mandatory withdrawal under 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e). But see note 254 infra.
244. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e).
245. Public Land Orders 5653 and 5654, 43 Fed. Reg. 59756 (1978). Some of the same lands
were also withdrawn by the President under the Antiquities Act, which authorized him to proclaim
national monuments. 16 U.S.C. §431 (1976). Later, some 40 million acres were withdrawn as
wildlife refuges under the Fish and Game Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 694, another statute authorizing executive withdrawals that was not repealed by the FLPMA.
246. See 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2) and note 204, supra. The same lands were also withdrawn under
§ 17(d)(l) which authorized the Secretary to withdraw lands needed to protect the public interest
under "existing authority" without a time limit. See note 103 supra. This apparently refers to
impliedly delegated withdrawal authority and authority under statutes, principally the Pickett Act.
If pending litigation challenging the executive's authority to withdraw lands covered by § 17(d)(2)
after the statutory termination date (see notes 121 and 123 supra) results in a rejection of the
government's contention that there was non-statutory authority for such withdrawals, their validity
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such lands were recommended for inclusion in one of the land management systems, the Secretary's withdrawals were to expire on December
18, 1978, if Congress did not act on the recommendations.247 As the
expiration date grew near, congressional efforts to2 4enact an Alaska lands
bill were blocked by the senators from that state. 1
With the termination of the Alaska withdrawals under ANCSA, millions
of acres would be available for selection by the State of Alaska and by
Native corporations formed under the Act. Alaska had been waiting for
twenty years for the fulfillment of the promise made in its Statehood Act
that it would be able to select and receive patents to 103,553,000 acres
9
28% of the state's total land area. At the time
of public land 24 -about
of statehood, almost all of the land in the state was federally owned and
it was understood that the land would be needed for the state's economic
growth and self sufficiency.25 °
Alaska became so anxious to get control of some of the resource-rich
public lands that it purported to select about 41 million acres several
would depend on the Pickett Act which did not authorize withdrawals from the mining laws. Thus,
mining claims on public lands in Alaska made in an otherwise valid manner after the § 17(d)(2)
withdrawals expired but before Congress withdrew the same lands in 1980 (Act of Dec. 2, 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-487, H 201-708, 94 Stat. 2371-2422) may still be valid if it is found that there
was no impliedly delegated authority at the time the withdrawals were made. See generally, DeStefano, The Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the State of Alaska, 21 ARIZ. L. REV.
417 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DeStefano]. Valid withdrawals under FLPMA before expiration of
§ 17(d)(2) withdrawals would also protect the land from mineral entry. See notes 252-255 infra and
accompanying text.
247. The withdrawals were to expire no later than five years after the date recommendations were
made. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2)(D). Recommendations were to be made within two years of the Act's
effective date (December 18, 1971). 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2)(C). The Secretary submitted his final
recommendations on December 17, 1973.
248. See DeStefano, supra note 246, at 419. The Senators objected to the amount of land that
would be closed to development by inclusion in wilderness areas and other conservation units.
249. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). Congress allowed a period
of 25 years for the selections because the vast land area had not been surveyed. See 104 CONG.
REC. 9341 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Saylor). Initial state land selections were protested by the
Bureau of Land Management on behalf of Native groups and Native claims were filed on about
80% of the state's lands. The Secretary finally instituted a "land freeze" suspending approval of all
state selections and other applications. It was formalized in Public Land Order No. 4582, issued
January 12, 1969 which withdrew all Alaska public lands. The state unsuccessfully challenged the
land freeze in Alaska v. Udall, 420 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1076 (,1970).
Approvals were then delayed on nearly all the lands for over eleven years by subsequent orders and
withdrawals under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. See notes 250-255 infra and accompanying text. Approvals were made possible by enactment of the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act, which also extended the time limit for state selections to 35 years. Act of Dec.
2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 906(a), 94 Stat. 2371, 2437. As a part of the settlement of a lawsuit
brought against the government by Alaska, the United States has agreed to convey at least 13 million
acres a year to the state. Alaska v. Reagan, No. A 78-291 CIV (D. Alas. Stipulation of Settlement,
Aug. 15, 1981). See note 123 supra.
250. See H .R. REP. NO. 624, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957), reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2939, 2940.
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weeks before the withdrawals under ANCSA expired.2 5' Shortly afterward, the Secretary was moved by a letter from the Chairman of the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to act under the FLPMA
252
to make an emergency withdrawal of the expiring ANCSA withdrawals.
The letter cited the recent state selections and a lawsuit 253 that Alaska had
filed seeking to prevent any government action to save the lands withdrawn under ANCSA from selection once the withdrawals expired. 254 The
Secretary of Interior later withdrew the same lands that had been subject
to the emergency withdrawals using his FLPMA authority to make withdrawals for twenty years.255
The facility with which the Secretary was able to withdraw millions
of acres of Alaska lands is testimony to the simplicity of the new procedures. The executive has essentially the same substantive power it had
under the earlier, impliedly delegated authority, but the twenty year limitation on most withdrawals forces rethinking the wisdom of a withdrawal
periodically and it is probably the most important limit on the executive's
withdrawal authority under the FLPMA. Executive authority is otherwise
encumbered only by requirements for notice, information reporting, and
public participation.
Congress can, of course, terminate a withdrawal of which it disapproves. Theoretically it will have more information on which to base any
action it takes when the FLPMA procedures are followed. But unless an
especially interested member of one of the key committees chooses to
scrutinize all withdrawals, the reporting requirements will be essentially
means of forcing the executive to make a closer consideration of any
withdrawal decision.
251. DeStefano, supra note 246, at 419. The lands were later made available for selection (Public
Land Order No. 5657, 44 Fed. Reg. 5433 (1979)), after which Alaska repeatedly notified the
Department of Interior of its selections by letter. Id., n.20. The 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act required the state to relinquish its claims to all selections of lands located within
national interest areas as a condition of rescinding administrative withdrawals of lands designated
in the Act. Act of Dec. 2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 1322(b), 94 Stat. 2371, 2487.
252. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1976).
253. Alaska v. Carter, 462 F.Supp. 1155 (D. Alas. 1978).
254. Letter from Morris K. Udall, Chairman, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
to Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, November 15, 1978. A portion of the letter appears
in Alaska v. Carter, 462 F.Supp. at 1158 n.5. The letter appears to be advisory only in that it simply
"urges" the Secretary to exercise his discretionary emergency withdrawal authority, rather than
reflecting a committee determination of an emergency that would trigger a duty to withdraw the
lands. A similar letter of request was sent to the Secretary by the committee chairman on May 4,
1979 after the committee found that uranium exploration on public lands in the Casitas Reservoir
watershed would endanger the water supply of Ojai and Ventura, California. Resolution of the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States House of Representatives, May 2, 1979.
While such requests are not mandatory, the Secretary's failure to respond by making a protective
withdrawal would court charges of abuse of discretion.
255. Public Land Order Nos. 56-5711, 45 Fed. Reg. 9562 (1980). These orders were superseded
when the 96th Congress passed an Alaska lands bill which was signed into law on December 2,
1980. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371.
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Congress has always had the authority to terminate an executive withdrawal 256 but has rarely done so in the past. 257 Now, under the FLPMA,
Congress's disapproval can be manifested in a concurrent resolution which
may avoid some of the procedures encumbering ordinary legislation,
although the action is subject to special procedural rules. Disapproval
must be effected within 90 days after a notice of the withdrawal is given
to Congress.2 8 It would seem that most members of Congress would be
uncomfortable overruling the executive's conservation decision on such
short notice except in an outrageous case. Most congressional disapprovals of executive withdrawals are likely to be by legislation after full
committee consideration as they were in the past.
The detailed FLPMA provisions for making withdrawals are not the
only means of accomplishing results that are within the Act's definition
provided for in the Act itself is through
of a "withdrawal." One method
"management decisions." 25 9 These decisions may be made to implement
land use plans required by the FLPMA for all public lands.26 ° The land
use planning authority of officials under the Act is "fully as restrictive
as traditional withdrawal." 2 6' Presumably, comprehensive planning was
intended by Congress to supplant single-purpose land use and withdrawal
decisions. Withdrawals may be used to carry out management decisions,
but a formal withdrawal is necessary only if lands are removed from, or
restored to, the operation of the 1872 Mining Act or lands are transferred
to another department.262 There are special procedures for notifying Congress if a management decision totally eliminates one or more uses on a
tract of 100,000 acres or more of public lands.263
In addition to the ability of land managers to effect land use decisions
that are the functional equivalents of withdrawals, other laws governing
256. Under any credible theory, executive authority to withdraw public lands is ultimately derived
from Congress. See note 46 supra. An understanding of preexisting congressional oversight authority
isreflected in the legislative history of the FLPMA. See 122 CONG. REC. 23438 (remarks of Rep.
Mink), 23440 (remarks of Rep. Forsythe), 23453 (remarks of Rep. Seiberling).
257. See notes 37-39, 50, 95, 159-160 supra and accompanying text. Although the possibility
of a presidential veto of a congressional termination of a withdrawal (or making of a withdrawal)
exists, no such showdown between the executive and legislative branches has occurred over a
withdrawal decision.
258. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1976). See note 225 supra.
259. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (1976).
260. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) directs the Secretary to:
develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by
tracts and areas for the use of the public lands regardless of whether such lands
previously have been classified, withdrawn, set aside, or otherwise designated for
one or more uses.
261. Peck, "And Then There Were None": Evolving Federal Restraints on the Availability of
Public Lands for Mineral Development, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-1, 3-87 (1979).
262. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)(3) (1976).
263. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)(2) (1976). The procedures for notice and congressional oversight are
nearly identical to those for formal withdrawals. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1), discussed in note 225
supra.
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public land administration may permit the exercise of executive managerial authority that may in practice fit the FLPMA definition of a withdrawal. Officials often take protective action effectively "limiting activities
under [laws making public lands available for private uses] in order to
. "" These actions need not
maintain other public values in the area ...
take the form of withdrawals when they are in furtherance of the officer's
existing management authority. Thus, the Secretary of Agriculture may
administratively determine that an area of a national forest is dedicated
to recreation and thereby ban inconsistent uses that are permitted by
statute.265 Similarly, land managers regularly must decide what areas of
a forest to withhold from timber cutting, what areas to limit to camping,
whether to close a park to fishing, and whether to lease lands for mineral
development. Congress did not intend to eliminate or erode existing
authority of managers under public land laws except as it expressly stated
in the FLPMA. 266 Although many actions might be taken under the withdrawal provisions of the Act, it is unnecessary to do so when the Secretary
under existing statutes to make determinations
has managerial discretion
2 67
having the same effect.
264. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j) (1976).
265. McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965) (upholding designation of a
"primitive area" in a national forest and the application of regulation prohibiting motorized vehicles);
see also Foster, Bureau of Land Management Primitive Areas-Are They Counterfeit Wilderness?,
16 NAT. RES. J. 621 (1976) (discussing the practice of designating BLM lands administratively as
wilderness beginning in 1969, before Congress directed wilderness studies). Cf. United States v.
Gregg, 290 F.Supp. 706 (W.D. Wash. 1968) (upholding regulations restricting aircraft use in a
wilderness area although the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1) (1976)) provided that such
uses may continue); United States v. Perko, 108 F.Supp. 315, aff d. 204 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953) (upholding aircraft ban in national forest roadless area designated
for recreational purposes). See generally, United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
266. In enacting the FLPMA Congress overhauled much of the authority to manage public lands
as it existed before the Act. Literally hundreds of public land laws were repealed. See Act of Oct.
21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2787-91. However, the legislation assiduously
provided that it was not to "repeal any existing law by implication." Id. § 701(f) (reprinted in note
following 43 U.S.C. § 1701). See also 43 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (1976) (FLPMA is to be supplemental,
and not in derogation of the public land statutes).
267. But see Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F.Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980). A
federal district court held that the Forest Service's failure to accept offers to lease lands for oil and
gas pending a "RARE 11"study of whether to include the lands in a wilderness system was tantamount
to a "withdrawal" under the FLPMA definition and could only be effective if statutory withdrawal
procedures were followed. The court in Mountain States erred in applying the definition mechanically
and in a way that failed to comport with the comprehensive statutory framework.
First, it should be pointed out that inaction on lease applications while the Secretary studies the
desirability of other uses in an area has never been considered to amount to withdrawal of the lands
in question. It is simply not within the common usage of the term. Withdrawals are generally made
by some specific public land order or a statute, not by inaction. See Duesing v. Udall, 350 F.2d
748,751 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1966), citing Richard K. Todd, 68 INTERIOR
DEC. 291 (1961). Current regulations so provide. 43 C.F.R. §2310.3-3. This is particularly applicable to the mineral leasing statutes in which there is no right of a lease applicant to expect action
issuing or rejecting a lease within a particular time. E.g., Burglin v. Morton, 527 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.
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1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976) (failure to make decision on lease application for several
years is not an action contrary to law); Rowe v. United States, 464 F.Supp. 1060, 1070 (D. Alas.
1979) (inaction on lease application for ten years is not unlawful). A lease applicant could only
challenge the Secretary's failure to act if it were "unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(l).
The Mountain States court seemed to recognize that inaction on a single lease could not constitute
a "withdrawal," but found that the cumulative effect of inaction on pending applications amounted
to a withdrawal. In light of the existence of discretion to withhold lands from leasing for a variety
of reasons as discussed below, and the fact that the Secretary had obviously chosen not to use the
option of withdrawal, the court should have deferred to the decision not to withdraw the lands. Cf.
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (whether series of proposed actions leading to coal
leasing in large geographic areas are so related as to amount to a "proposal" requiring an environmental impact statement is a question for the agency to decide).
Second, the Secretary had ample statutory authority to hold lease applications pending a thorough
designation. The legislative history of the FLPMA shows that the Department of the Interior had
expressed concern that if FLPMA's broad definition were adopted it would give rise to arguments
that the only way to accomplish results within its scope would be by withdrawal. Letter from
Assistant Secretary of the Interior to James A. Haley, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, dated November 21, 1975, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6215-16. But the concern was unjustified given the existence of alternate means to
achieve those results within FLPMA itself and within other statutory programs for land management
that were not repealed expressly or by implication (see note 256, supra).
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA), which was enacted almost simultaneously with
the FLPMA, imposed planning responsibilities on the Secretary. It required that wilderness be among
the "multiple use" considerations of the Secretary in his forest management land use planning. 16
U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1), (g)(3)(A), and 1606(d). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1642(a)(1). The Multiple Use,
Sustained Yield Act also declares establishment and maintenance of wilderness to be consistent with
its purposes. 16 U.S.C. § 529. The responsibility to consider wilderness options can only be fulfilled
if wilderness characteristics are preserved during the planning stages; otherwise wilderness values
may be irreversibly lost to development. Neither the NFMA. in the case of national forests, nor the
FLPMA provisions, in the case of Bureau of Land Management lands, requires a withdrawal to be
made during the planning process. It hardly seems advisable to impose the encumbrance of a
withdrawal on an area that may not ultimately be recommended or set aside as wilderness.
RARE I1should be considered a program that carries out land management planning responsibilities
and authority of the Secretary of Agriculture. It was part of an ongoing wilderness review process
that had begun in 1969. See California v. Bergland. 483 F.Supp. 465 (E.D. Calif. 1980), appeal
pending, for a history of the RARE process. It would be reading FLPMA too broadly and out of
context to say that it impliedly extinguished an ongoing land use planning process. There is no
legislative history showing any such intent. Indeed, Congress seemed to validate the RARE process,
which was pending and known to Congress when it enacted the NFMA in which the Secretary was
made responsible for wilderness planning.
Even in absence of wilderness planning authority under land management statutes such as the
FLPMA and the NFMA, the Secretary had authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to refuse leases
for the protection of the public lands. The Mountain States court did acknowledge the well-established
principle that the Secretary has discretion under the Mineral Leasing Act to decide what lands will
be leased, Burglin v. Morton, 527 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976); Pease v. Udall, 332 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.
1964), and to refuse any lease of particular lands, Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965). But it
attempted to distinguish the case law as not supporting an exercise of discretion to withhold land
from leasing "based on environmental concerns." 499 F.Supp. at 391-92. This distinction is illfounded. In Udall v. Tallman the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of secretarial discretion to
refuse leases where the purpose was to protect wildlife. An attempt to limit Tallman as permitting
a refusal to lease only on a particular tract but not a closure of hundreds of square miles of public
lands was rebuffed in Duesing v. Udall, 350 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912
(1966). Mountain States incorrectly relied on "the proposition that the focus of [the Mineral Leasing]
Act was mineral development despite the primitive nature of much of the public lands." 499 F.Supp.
at 392. In Duesing v. Udall the court rejected an argument that "the Secretary can only exercise his
discretion under the Mineral Leasing Act by taking action in furtherance of the objective of that act
to promote mineral development in the public domain." 350 F.2d at 751. Because there are other
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The FLPMA withdrawal provisions allow the Secretary of Interior to
take extraordinary actions, required to protect public lands from disposal
or particular uses. For example, the Secretary's withdrawal of much of
the Alaska national interest lands pending congressional actions was made
in reliance upon the statute.268 Withdrawals may often be avoided, but
purposes for holding and using the land, the court held that decisions whether or not to lease need
not consider solely the purpose of the lease, as urged by a disappointed lease applicant. The argument
was characterized as a "tail wags dog construction [that] is not put forward as supported by legislative
history," and the court upheld the Secretary's "reasonable construction" of his powers to determine
whether to lease in light of a concern for wildlife protection. Id. Cf. Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d
235,-240 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no abuse of discretion in Secretary's suspension of issuance of coal
prospecting permits that was based on desire to provide "more 'orderly' development of coal resources
upon the public lands ... with a proper regard for the protection of the environment"); United
States v. Cotter Corp., 486 F.Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979) (BLM has authority to manage public lands
to prevent impairment of wilderness characteristics).
A further reason that environmental protection as a goal would seem to fall easily within the scope
of discretion allowed to the Secretary in making a leasing decision is that every agency is now
required by the National Environmental Policy Act to consider such matters in all its decisions. See
note 182 supra. Cf. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910
(1971) (Under NEPA and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.L. §§601, 602, Corps of
Engineers properly denied dredge and fill permit although the project would not interfere with
navigation, flood control, or power production). And major federal actions in leasing lands under
the Mineral Leasing Act require the preparation of environmental impact statements. See note 188
supra. Furthermore, the FLPMA manifests an intention that federal land be managed by the Secretary
of the Interior according to multiple use principles, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (1976), and to further
a variety of goals besides resource development. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8), (a)(12) (1976).
A separate ground for the court's decision in Mountain States was the failure of the Secretary to
set forth in rules and regulations the procedure that was followed in coordinating applications for
leases in national forests with the Department of Agriculture and the grounds for approving, rejecting,
or denying them. 499 F.Supp. at 395-96. The court concluded that the absence of regulations violated
the FLPMA section bringing public land management within the Administrative Procedure'Act and
requiring promulgation of rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of the FLPMA and other
public land laws. 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1976). This ignores the fact that administrative decisions and
policies may be made by means other than rulemaking without violating the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). E.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 (1947).
The rulemaking provision was included in the FLPMA following a recommendation of the Public
Land Law Review Commission that there be greater use of regulations in public land management.
See PLLRC REPORT, supra note 7 at 251. The "hidden law" of the Department of the Interior has
been notorious. E.g., Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive
Department: Reflections on the Interior Department's Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM.
L. REV. 1231 (1974). Matters involving "public property" have always been exempt from the APA.
5 U.S.C. §553(a)(2) (1976). In the FLPMA Congress removed the exemption for public land
management matters. This only meant that public land management was to be treated the same as
other agencies' functions are treated under the APA. A general concern for openness in government,
as well as the special concern in public land law found in 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(5) and 1740 make
it desirable for the Secretary of the Interior to explicate formally the process to be followed in dealing
with applications for mineral leasing in RARE II wilderness study areas. The APA does not necessarily
require that rulemaking under § 553 be followed. But if rulemaking were required, presumably both
the mineral leasing program and the RARE 11program should be stayed pending appropriate rulemaking. The Mountain States court effectively required the leasing program to proceed and the
RARE process to cease.
Notwithstanding several errors by the trial court in Mountain States, the United States dismissed
its appeal of the decision on March 4, 1981 based on a directive of Reagan administration officials.
268. See notes 245-255 supra and accompanying text.
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when they are used the FLPMA surrounds the process with new procedures and ultimate congressional checks that can undo executive actions
swiftly in egregious cases. 26 9 The sobering effect of the procedural requisites and the specter of congressional oversight may assure greater
responsibility in using the authority. However, the broadened definition
of "withdrawal" in the Act 2 T and explicit authority to use withdrawals
as a means of implementing the land use planning requirements of FLPMA 7'
suggest that the withdrawal device may have even greater importance as
a land management device in the future than it had in the past.
C. Judicial Review
The tide of legislation imposing obligations on managers of public
lands to administer resources under careful standards and to consider
environmental factors has been accompanied by greater judicial scrutiny
of decisionmaking. In recent years there has been an unprecedented number of cases seeking review of agency decisions regarding the public
lands.27 2 Several reasons account for the growth in litigation. The most
important is that Congress has enacted laws which provide standards to
guide courts in their review of agency actions. Understandably, the earliest
public lands cases were confined largely to challenges of agency actions
refusing to dispense public property to private interests rather than cases
asserting the interest of the public.273 Even in that age, a rule of construction in public land law required that federal grants be viewed favorably to the United States.274 Later, national policy began to prefer
continued federal management of most remaining federal lands. Relevant
statutes gave managers great discretion and little guidance. Authority was
broadly delegated to the executive branch and courts regularly upheld
these delegations275 and their exercise.27 6 With the exception of parks,
which have been subject to rather specific management objectives since
269. See notes 221-235 supra and accompanying text.
270. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j). See note 219 supra.
271. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)(3).
272. See generally, G. COGGINS AND C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAW 226-227 (1981).
273. See Wilkinson, Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threadsand Future Directions, I PUB.
LAND L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1980). See also note 14 supra.
274. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957); Caldwell v. United States,
250 U.S. 14, 20 (1919), United States v. Oregon and California R.R., 164 U.S. 526, 541 (1896);
Sioux City & St. Paul R.R. v. United States, 159 U.S. 349, 360 (1895); Leavenworth, Lawrence,
and Galveston R.R. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 740 (1895); Dubuque and Pac. R.R. v. Litchfield,
64 U.S. (23 How.) 457, 462 (1859). The Court applied the principle recently in Andrus v. Charlestone
Stone Products, Inc., 436 U.S. 604 (1978). But see Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668
(1979).
275. E.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (Forest Service Organic Act's delegation
of authority to make rules and regulations concerning use of forest reserves).
276. E.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911) (Forest Reserve grazing regulations).
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at least 1916,277 there was little substantive law to curb or define the
administrative discretion of public land managers until the 1970s.2 78 Consequently, challenges to public land management decisions have not fared
well in the courts.279
Congressional prescriptions for public land management were responsive to burgeoning conservationist sentiments.280 An aware public insisted
on responsible administration of its commonly held resources. The same
public became the watchdog of the administrators, pooling their resources
and power in organizations to assert the "public interest." These groups
turned to the courts where they were generally received hospitably. The
Supreme Court has recognized that harm to "aesthetic and environmental
well-being" constitutes "injury" for the purpose of standing to sue, requiring only that there be allegations of an adverse effect on group members' "activities and pastimes" on affected public lands. 28' The Court has
thus disavowed restrictions that would allow access to judicial review
only to those suffering economic harm and harm that is not widely shared .282
Once a party has access to court, it may argue the public interest in
283
support of claims that an agency has not lived up to statutory mandates.
It appears that courts are now more liberal in allowing judicial review in
cases against government agencies alleging environmental harm than they
are in other contexts, such as constitutional violations resulting in economic harm. 284 The Supreme Court has inferred an intent by Congress
to allow persons to act as "private attorneys general ' 285 when asserting
277. See Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1.
278. See statutes cited in notes 191-192 supra. The Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act was
enacted in 1960 but it appeared to be little more than a statement of policy accompanied by definitions.
16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31. Managers were left to interpret and apply the act according to their best guess
as to its meaning. See Loesch, Multiple Uses of Public Lands-Accommodationor ChoosingBetween
Conflicting Uses, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1971); Strand, StatutoryAuthority Governing
Management of the National Forest System-Time for a Change?, 7 NAT. RES. LAW. 479 (1974);
Comment, Managing the Federal Lands: Replacing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE L. J. 787
(1973).
279. See Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forests, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 393 (1962). Some
have argued for closer judicial scrutiny. E.g., Miller, Judicial Control of Forest Service Discretion
Under the Multiple Use Act, 5 ENVT'L L. 127 (1974).
280. S. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1963); Martz, Conservation of the Environment as a
Public Resource, 18 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 225 (1973); Muskie, An EnvironmentalProgram
for America, I ENV. LAW 2 (1970); Clary, Roe, and Swearingen, Environmental Priorities of
Opinion-Makers, 6 ENVT'L AFFAIRS 33 (1977).
281. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
282. Id. at 734, 738. See Parker and Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 771, 772 (1978).
283. 405 U.S. at 737. See also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-90 (1973); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
284. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) with United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
285. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-41 (1972); Association of Data Processing
Service Organization v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
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they are aggrieved within the scope of statutes which arguably protect
the public's interest in management of publicly owned natural resources.
The inference is supported by statutory provisions encouraging public
involvement in decisionmaking,286 expressing the policy that there should
be judicial review,287 and requiring more intensive land management.288
The increased activity in judicial review of land management agency
decisions contrasts with the traditional approach of denying review to
such matters. The approaches of courts in reviewing administrative decisions varies with the agency whose decision is being reviewed and the
type of decision that is being challenged.289 Courts have viewed public
land management as being encumbered by vague mandates, broad discretion, and a need for expertise, so there has been little room for judicial
oversight until recently.29 The criterion is whether there is "law to apply"
which would enable the court to decide the case without substituting its
judgment for that of the agency. 29' Some statutes enabling agencies to
manage public lands remain remarkably nondirective and without obvious
standards. 29 2 When these non-directive laws are involved, courts will
286. See note 180 supra. Cf. Citizens for a Better Environment v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 649 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1979) (requiring regulations providing for citizen participation in
enforcement as condition of federal approval of state plan under Clean Water Act).
287. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(6) (1976). The policy
expressed in that act is apparently limited to adjudicatory decisions. Landstrom, An Operational
View of the BLM Organic Act, 54 DEN. L. J. 455, 458 (1977). See also provisions for citizen suits
and awards of attorney's fees in environmental statutes (16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1974) (Endangered
Species Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1978) (Clean Water Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1976) (Ocean
Dumping Act); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1980 Supp.) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604,
7607(f) (1980 Supp.) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. §4911 (1977) (Noise Control Act)).
288. See notes 175-180 supra and accompanying text; S. Rep. No. 93-686, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4072; House Report No. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6175, 6179-6181. See also Culham and
Friesma, Land Use Planning for the Public Lands, 19 NAT. RES. J. 43 (1979) and Greenfield, The
National Forest Service and the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974,
15 NAT. RES. J. 603 (1975).
289. For an illuminating discussion of approaches to judicial review in public land law see
Wilkinson, Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, I PUB. LAND L.
REV. 1, 23-29 (1980). Cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (suggesting an increased role for the judiciary in the administration of environmental laws).
290. See Comment, The Conservationists and the Public Lands: Administrative and Judicial
Remedies Relating to the Use and Disposition of the Public Lands Administered by the Department
of the Interior, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1200, 1236-42 (1970). Until enactment of the FLPMA, there
was often an additional problem for reviewing courts because agency rulemaking concerning public
land management was not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2). 43
U.S.C. § 1740; see note 267 supra.
291. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). In a case challenging
denial of homestead applications based on classification of land for retention in public ownership,
the Ninth Circuit of Appeals said of the Classification and Multiple Use Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 14111418 (expired Dec. 23, 1970): "The provisions of this statute breathe discretion at every pore .
Id. at 469. The court declined to assert jurisdiction, finding no law to apply:
[Tlhe broader the language of a statute, the less specific it is, and the more nebulous
the Congressional intent, the harder it will be for the court to say that an agency
acted beyond the bounds of discretion committed to it by law.
Id. at 470 n.3.
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usually refuse review, finding that "agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." 293 Thus, rarely applied exceptions to the Administrative Procedure Act's judicial review provisions have been utilized in public
lands cases more often than in other fields.
Statutes mandating more intensive land management generally implement modem public lands policy: intensive management for a potpourri
of uses and purposes, with a pervasive concern for environmental protection. The federal land manager must choose from an array of objectives
and approaches. Formerly unbridled discretion is confined by definition
of land management agency missions and specific procedures for accomplishing them.294 Many decisions remain within an aura of discretion that
ordinarily will not be curtailed or invaded by a court unless a congressional
directive is violated. Choices among uses will generally be safe from
judicial review so long as they do not depart from the procedures, the
standards or the purposes of the statutes. But when a party alleges that
the manager has forsaken the agency mission by ignoring the care and
protection of certain lands, there may be "law to apply" and a court will
review.2 95 If land use priorities have been set by formal rulemaking, they
may be judicially enforceable against the government if it departs from
the plan without following procedures.296 On the other hand, Congress
has added little to its broad delegations of discretion for disposal of federal
lands, 297 leaving the negative decision-not to develop, to dispose of or
to allow entry upon particular lands-relatively free from review.
Once a court grants review, it is likely to defer to an agency practice
or decision that comports with the agency's own established interpretation
of the governing statute. 298 But agency interpretations that are out of step
292. E.g., Forest Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§473-478, 479-482, 551 (1976); Multiple
Use, Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§528-531 (1976); General Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. §22
(1976); Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976 & Supp.II 1978); Taylor Grazing Act,
43 U.S.C. §315 (1976).
293. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). E.g., Nelson v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir., 1978); Santa
Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir., 1978); Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467 (9th Cir., 1975);
Ness Inv. Corp. v. Department of Agriculture, 512 F.2d 706 (9th Cir., 1975).
294. See Wilkinson, Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, I PUB.
LAND L. REV. 1, 6 (1980).
295. Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793, 795, 796, 797 (1971); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410; Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061, 1065 (1975); National Forest
Preservation Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408, 411 (1973). See also Comment, The Conservationists
and the Public Lands: Administrative and Judicial Remedies Relating to the Use and Disposition of
the Public Lands Administered by the Department of Interior, 68 MICH L. REV. 1260, 1236-42
(1970).
296. Peck, "And Then There Were None"-Evolving Federal Restraints on the Availability of
Public Lands for Mineral Development, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-1, 3-87 (1979). Cf.
Kaploski, Power Plant Siting on Public Lands: A Proposal for Resolving the Environmental-Development Conflict, 56 DEN. L. J. 179 (1979) (arguing that the FLPMA may impose an environmental
mandate on siting questions).
297. See generally, COGGINS & WILKINSON, supra note 17 at 231-233.
298. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
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with statutory language or purpose will not receive the same deference;
statutory interpretation ultimately remains a judicial function.2 99 In public
land law, resort to the purpose of statutory schemes has often guided
judicial construction. 3°° On occasion the Supreme Court has strained to
find an intent to preserve public resources and to deny private interests
in them, although the statutes under which the private interests were
asserted were passed in an age when disposal of public lands was in
vogue.3"'
So long as the volume and thrust of statutory law is directed at protection and judicious use of public lands, it is reasonable to expect more
deferential treatment of interpretations that deny development, demand
caution in use, or prefer non-damaging uses than of interpretations that
err on the side of facilitating development. Thus, it is predictable that an
agency's broad interpretation of its own withdrawal authority under the
FLPMA is more likely to be upheld if challenged than one that encourages
development by restricting the ability of the Secretary to withdraw lands
beyond the requirements of the Act.3" 2
The only significant possibilities for judicial intrusion into the realm
of administrative decisions to withdraw public lands will arise when an
agency fails to adhere scrupulously to procedural mandates. FLPMA is
quite specific as to the procedure for making withdrawals3. 3 and any party
299. E.g., Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917
(1973).
300. In West Virginia Div. of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th
Cir. 1975) the court construed the Forest Service Organic Act's authority to sell "the dead, matured
or large growth of trees" in national forests (16 U.S.C. §476) as not broad enough to authorize
clear-cutting. The Forest Service offered other interpretations of the literal language but the court
found that Congress's primary concern in passing the Act was "preservation of the national forests."
Accord, Zieske v. Butz, 406 F.Supp. 258 (D. Alas. 1975). The ban on clear-cutting was lifted when
Congress enacted the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 in a
context of required planning and generally more limited discretion.
See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Citizens for a
Better Environment v. Environmental Protection Agency, 649 F.2d 522 (7th Cir., 1979); Buck v.
Morton, 449 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1971); Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F.Supp. 284
(N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376 F.Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Sierra
Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F.Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), affd, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
301. E.g., United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 353 U.S, 112 (1957) (finding a mineral
reservation in a right of way granted to railroad, though that section of act was silent and express
reservations were in other sections and acts). See also, United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d
1271 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 911 (1977); Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475
F.Supp. 654 (D. Wyo. 1979). But cf. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (U.S.
did not impliedly reserve an easement allowing a road to be built across railroad grant lands without
compensation). See discussion in Wilkinson, Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future
Directions, I PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 29-34 (1980).
302. But cf. Peck, "And Then There Were None" Evolving Federal Restraints on the Availability
of Public Lands for Mineral Development, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-1, 3-13 (1976)
(arguing that "national policies and statutory mandates" are contrary to executive decisions denying
development).
303. See notes 226-244 supra and accompanying text.
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aggrieved by a failure to follow these procedures is assured judicial
review.3 4 Not only is it appropriate for a court to insist on exacting
compliance with the procedures designed by Congress, but it is consistent
with the type of review courts regularly indulge, even when the substantive mandate of a statute is vague.30 5
The thesis that courts should demand greater justification for an administrative decision opening or allowing development on public lands
than for protecting or withdrawing the same lands also finds support in
the public trust doctrine. Traditionally, the doctrine has been narrowly
applied to restrict major state conveyances of tidelands,3" 6 but increasingly
a variant of the doctrine is being urged and accepted as a means 3of
07
construing obligations of federal agencies under the public land laws.
The theory is that public lands are to be held and managed consistently
with a trust implied from the high standards set for stewardship of federal
lands in modem statutes. Thus, as gaps must be filled and vague statutes
interpreted, the context is to be one of protection of the public interest
in federal lands and resources.3 8 This inference flows from Congress's
statutory scheme for public land management. It compels a broad construction of agency powers over federal property and even can be the
basis of judicial mandates to exercise available authority to protect public
lands. 30 9 To the extent the rationale of the conservation-oriented doctrine
is accepted it would support protective exercises of executive withdrawal
authority.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal uncertainties concerning withdrawal that dominated the past
are largely resolved. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act provides authority and intelligible standards for withdrawals made after its
effective date. Compliance with the Act's procedural requirements is
readily measurable. The validity of withdrawals made without statutory
304. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D), directs a reviewing court to set
aside agency decisions that were reached "without observance of procedure required by law."
305. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608
(2nd Cir., 1965). See generally W. RODGERS, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
104-28 (1979).
306. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
307. An enlightening and analytical explication of this subject is found in Wilkinson, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 269 (1981).
308. Id. at 311-13.
309. E.g., Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 424 F.Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club
v. Department of Interior, 398 F.Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Department of Interior,
376 F.Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). But see Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See
generally, Comment, Proprietary Duties of the Federal Government Under the Public Land Trust,
75 MICH. L. REV. 586 (1977).
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authority after Congress's major entry into the field in 1910 may still be
challenged, but the prospects for success are dim. Although the Supreme
Court has not considered the question, Congress confirmed that authority
to make withdrawals independent of statute had been delegated to the
executive by repealing that authority in 1976. The same legislation should
seal the fate of attempted non-statutory withdrawals after 1976. But other
devices are available to effect the same results as withdrawals. Some are
provided in the FLPMA; others are within the discretion of land managers
to restrict the uses permitted on public land. Major actions involving
timber sales, mineral leases, wildlife protection and recreational values
may fall within administrative authority to classify and to manage public
lands under the FLPMA or under other statutes not changed by the Act.
Defining the reach of authority, as well as the authority under withdrawal
statutes, is a task that belongs primarily to the executive itself. Pervasive
congressional concern with conservation makes administrative actions
that tend to protect publicly owned resources virtually invulnerable to
judicial challenge.

